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I. INTRODUCTION
In October 1994, Congress approved the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994,' which revised various provisions of the United States Bankruptcy
Code.2 The revisions included two amendments to the preference statute, 11
U.S.C. § 547. Historically, a creditor generally could preserve from
preference attack an otherwise voidable purchase money security interest if the
creditor perfected its security interest no later than the tenth day after the
debtor first possessed the collateral.3 In an attempt to conform the
Bankruptcy Code to state law, most notably Article Nine of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), the Reform Act doubled the post-possession
perfection period from ten to twenty days by revising 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(3)(B).4 The Reform Act also amended 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2), the
provision that dictates when the alleged preferential transfer occurred. In
* Assistant Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. B.S.B.A., Central
Missouri State University, 1981; J.D., Brigham Young University, 1986. William P.
Bowes, Jr., W. David East, Mark E. Steiner, Dulcie Green Wink, and John J. Worley
offered many insightful comments on earlier drafts.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4106 (codified in various sections of 11 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter "Reform Act"].
2. The United States Bankruptcy Code is codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq.
(1994), as amended by the Reform Act. Unless otherwise indicated, or unless
referenced in a discussion of any case decided under the pre-revised version of the
Bankruptcy Code, citations are to the Bankruptcy Code as amended by the Reform
Act.
3. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) (pre-Reform Act).
4. Reform Act § 203(1). See also H. R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 45 (1994), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3354:
Section 547(c)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a trustee may
not avoid the perfection of [a] purchase-money security interest as a
preference if it occurs within 10 days of the debtor receiving possession of
the property. This section conforms bankruptcy law practices to most
States' practice by granting purchase-money security lenders a 20-day
period in which to perfect their security interest.
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general, the pre-revised provision stated that a transfer in the form of a
security interest occurred on the date of attachment if the security interest
became perfected no later than the tenth day thereafter; if perfection occurred
more than ten days following attachment, then the transfer was deemed to
occur on the perfection date.5 For no apparent reason, the Reform Act
revised 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) by inserting at the end of subsection (A) an
innocuous cross-reference to II U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B), the other preference
provision impacted by the Reform Act."
After first discussing the basics of a preference attack on an Article Nine
security interest, this article summarizes the leading cases that prompted
Congress to amend 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B), suggests that the amendment
fails to completely eliminate the possibility of continuing conflict between
state commercial law and the Bankruptcy Code, and offers an analytical road
map for courts that continue to confront the dilemma. Finally, the article
raises possible interpretive problems created by the amendment to 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(2) and proposes a statutory construction of the amendment that may
render those problems moot.
If. A PREFERENCE PRIMER
Section 547(b) describes the seven elements of a preference. The
bankruptcy trustee bears the burden of proving each element by a
preponderance of the evidence.
First, the action being challenged by the trustee must constitute a
transfer,' which the Bankruptcy Code defines as:
every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in
property, including retention of title as a security interest and foreclosure
of the debtor's equity of redemption[.]9
5. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A), (B) (pre-Reform Act).
6. Reform Act § 203(2).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1994); Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus.,
Inc.), 78 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Prescott, 805 F.2d 719, 726 (7th Cir. 1986);
P.A. Bergner v. Bank One, Milwaukee, N.A. (In re P.A. Bergner & Co. Holding Co.),
187 B.R. 964, 972-73 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994) (prefatory language).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (1994).
[Vol. 62
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Two forms of transfer most likely to be attacked by the trustee in any
collateralized lending transaction are (i) the conveyance of the property
interest in the collateral and (ii) any repayment of the secured debt.1"
Second, the property transferred must be the debtor's property."
Property interests conveyed by other non-bankrupt parties, such as a loan
payment made by a guarantor or a security interest granted by an affiliated
entity, cannot be challenged. 2
Third, the transfer must be "to or for the benefit of a creditor[.]"'3 The
Bankruptcy Code defines "creditor" as including any "entity that has a claim
against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief
concerning the debtor." 4 A "claim" includes any right to payment, "whether
or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured[.]" 5 The transfer may, but need not, be both to, and
10. See 4 JAMES J. WHrTE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 32-4, at 253 (4th ed. 1995 [Practitioner's Edition]) [hereinafter WHrrE & SUMMERS]
("Mhe most common [voidable preference] is the payment of a debt within the 90
days preceding the filing of a petition in bankruptcy.... Of greater importance for
the users of this book is the second common form of preference, namely the transfer
of security in the debtor's property within the 90 days prior to the petition."); id. at
256 ("Since the creation and perfection of a security interest is a conveyance of rights
in the debtor's property to the creditor in the most basic sense, these acts fall within
the definition [of 'transfer']."); id at 259 ("The usual preference is a direct transfer
from the debtor to the creditor in the form of the payment of a debt, transfer of a
security interest in the debtor's property, or the transfer of some other property
interest.") (footnote omitted).
11. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994) (prefatory language). State law dictates whether
the property transferred belonged to the debtor. See In re Smith, 966 F.2d 1527, 1530
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1030 (1992).
12. See, e.g., Tolz v. Barnett Bank of South Florida, N.A. (In re Safe-T-Brake of
South Florida, Inc.), 162 B.R. 359, 363 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) ("The law is clear that
if a third party chooses for whatever reason to use its own property, in which the
debtor has no interest, to pay one or more of the debtor's creditors, even if the other
[six] elements of a voidable preference are established, the transfer cannot be
recovered by the trustee."); Hood v. Brownyard-Sharon Park Ctr., Inc. (In re Hood),
118 B.R. 417, 419 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1990) ("A transfer of money or property by a third
person to a creditor of debtor, when the money or property does not issue from the
property of the debtor, is not a preference.").
13. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) (1994).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (1994).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994). "Whether an entity holds a right which falls
within the definition of a 'claim' under § 101(5) is determined by state law."
Hostrnann v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A. (In re XTI Xonix Technologies,
Inc.), 156 B.R. 821, 827 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993).
1997]
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for the benefit of, the same creditor. For example, a borrower's repayment of
guaranteed debt is a transfer to the lender and for the benefit of each
guarantor.1
6
Fourth, the debtor must make the transfer for pre-existing debt. 7
Proving this element requires the trustee to establish and compare two dates:
(i) the date when the debtor incurred the debt, and (ii) the date of the transfer.
Section 547(e) of the Bankruptcy Code states that a transfer occurs:
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and
the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such
time, except as provided in subsection (c)(3)(B);
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected
after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such
transfer is not perfected at the later of-
(i) the commencement of the case; or
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee.' 8
Paraphrased (and postponing discussion of the "except" clause in clause
(A) until later'9), a transfer occurs when it takes effect between the parties
if it is perfected within ten days thereafter; otherwise, the transfer occurs at
the moment of perfection. If perfection does not occur by the tenth day
following the petition date, the transfer is deemed to occur immediately before
the petition date. 0
16. See, e.g., Levit v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re V. N. Deprizio Constr.
Co.), 874 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 1989).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1994).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) (1994). In no event, however, may a transfer occur
before the debtor acquires rights in the transferred property. Id. (introductory clause
making clauses (A), (B), and (C) subject to paragraph 3); 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1994)
("For the purposes of [section 547], a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired
rights in the property transferred.").
Without 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(C) (1994), the trustee would find itself in the
unusual position of being unable to attack an unperfectedsecurity interest as a voidable
preference. But what is meant by the subsection's opening language, "immediately
before the date of the filing of the petition"? For an interesting commentary, see
David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in the Crucible of Voidable Preference Law,
1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 222-23.
19. See infra Part IV.
20. Generally, the filing of the bankruptcy petition prevents a creditor from taking
subsequent action to perfect a security interest transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4)
(1994). However, the filing of the petition does not prohibit a creditor from taking
"any act to perfect. . . an interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and
[Vol. 62
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To illustrate, Debtor borrows $1,000,000 from Lender on May 1. To
secure repayment of the loan, Lender obtains an Article Nine security interest
in two major pieces of Debtor's equipment. The Bankruptcy Code does not
state when the security interest "takes effect" between Debtor and Lender, but
instead defers to other applicable law.2" An Article Nine security interest
powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this title or to the extent
that such act is accomplished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A)
of this title[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (1994). The bankruptcy trustee acquires certain
rights and powers "as of the commencement of the case." 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994).
See also 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302, 303 (1994) (indicating that a case commences upon
the filing of the petition). Included within these rights and powers is the status of a
hypothetical judicial lien creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (1994). Generally, the
property interest of a lien creditor is greater than the competing unperfected property
interest of a secured party. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b). Therefore, the trustee, as a
hypothetical lien creditor, usually can void any security interest that is unperfected on
the petition date. However, the rights and powers of the trustee "are subject to any
generally applicable law that-(A) permits perfection of an interest in property to be
effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date of
perfection[.]" 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1)(A) (1994). One such "generally applicable law"
permits an unperfected security interest to enjoy priority over the pre-existing rights
of a lien creditor if (1) the security interest attaches (becomes enforceable) under
U.C.C. § 9-203(1) before the rights of the lien creditor arise, (2) the security interest
qualifies as a purchase money security interest, and (3) the secured party perfects its
interest by filing a financing statement within ten days after the debtor first possesses
the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-301(2). See also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 86 (1978),
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5872 (expressly referring to U.C.C. § 9-301(2)
in discussing phrase "generally applicable law"). For example, Secured Party obtains
a security interest in Debtor's equipment that attaches on May 1, the same day that
Debtor takes possession of the equipment. Unsecured Creditor obtains the status of
a lien creditor on May 5. Secured Party perfects its security interest by filing a proper
financing statement with the appropriate recording office on May 9. If the security
interest enjoys purchase money status under U.C.C. § 9-107, Secured Party's interest
enjoys priority over the competing interest of Unsecured Creditor under U.C.C.
§ 9-301(2), even though Unsecured Creditor's interest arose before Secured Party
perfected its interest. If Debtor had filed its bankruptcy petition on May 5 (at which
time the bankruptcy trustee would become a hypothetical lien creditor), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 362(b)(3) (1994) and 546(b)(1)(A) (1994) working together would allow the same
result by permitting Secured Party to take timely post-petition steps to perfect its
security interest without violating the automatic stay. Secured Party can achieve the
same result even if its security interest does not qualify for purchase money status.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (1994) (permitting post-petition acts to perfect a security
interest if those steps are "accomplished within the period provided under section
547(e)(2)(A)"); 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1994) (generally referring to a ten-day
period between attachment and perfection).
21. SeeDAviD G. EPsTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCy § 6-11, at 297 (1993) [hereinafter
19971
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"takes effect," or becomes enforceable, between Debtor and Lender upon
"attachment."22 Lender's security interest "attaches" as soon as Debtor has
rights in the collateral (the equipment), Debtor executes a written security
agreement that describes the collateral (the equipment), and Lender gives value
(the $1,000,000 loan).' If the security interest has attached, it becomes
"perfected" when Lender files its financing statement.24 If attachment occurs
EPSTEN] ("Nonbankruptcy law determines when a transfer is effective between the
parties and against third persons[.]").
22. See Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586,
591 (5th Cir. 1987), reh'ggranted, 835 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1988) ("The phrase 'takes
effect' is undefined in the Bankruptcy Code, but under Uniform Commercial Code
Article 9 law, a transfer of a security interest 'takes effect' when the security interest
attaches."); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc. (In re Ken Gardner
Ford Sales, Inc.), 10 B.R. 632,643 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981), affd, 23 B.R. 743 (E.D.
Tenn. 1982) ("The transfer of a security interest takes effect between the parties when
the debtor acquires rights in the collateral, or in U.C.C. terminology, when the security
interest attaches."); Thomas M. Ward & Jay A. Shulman, In Defense of the Bankruptcy
Code's Radical Integration of the Preference Rules Affecting Commercial Financing,
61 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 1, 66 n.215 (1983) ("The phrase in § 547(e) 'at the time such
transfer takes effect' is not defined in the Code and apparently refers to effectiveness
under applicable state or federal law. For an Article 9 security interest, this occurs at
attachment.").
Legislative history indicates that Congress did not use the term "attachment" in
the preference statute because not all transfers involve Article Nine security interests;
nevertheless, when the challenged transfer involves an Article Nine security interest
the phrase "becomes effective between the parties" is synonymous with "attachment."
See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 204, 213
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6164, 6173.
23. SeeU.C.C.§§ 9-203(1), 9-105(1)(1) (defining "security agreement"), 1-201(44)
(defining "value"). A security interest can attach absent a written security agreement
if the secured party either possesses the collateral or controls investment property. See
U.C.C.§§ 9-203(1), 9-115(1)(e) (defining "control"), 9-115(1)(f) (defining "investment
property").
24. Under the U.C.C., "[a] security interest is perfected when it has attached and
when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been taken." U.C.C. § 9-
303(1). One of the "applicable steps" is the filing of a financing statement. Id
(indicating that "such steps" are specified in various provisions, including U.C.C. § 9-
302); U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(a) (requiring a secured party to file a financing statement in
order to perfect a non-possessory security interest in equipment). If the creditor elects
to file its financing statement before attachment exists, then the security interest
becomes perfected not at the moment of filing but at the time of attachment. See
U.C.C. § 9-303 Official Comment 1 ("If the steps for perfection have been taken in
advance (as when the secured party files a financing statement before giving value or
before the debtor acquires rights in the collateral), then the interest is perfected
[Vol. 62
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on May 1 and Lender files its financing statement on May 7, then the transfer
takes place on May 1 under clause (A) because attachment and perfection
occurred within a ten-day period. If attachment occurs on May 1 and Lender
files its financing statement on May 13, then the transfer takes place on May
13 under clause (B) because the security interest was perfected more than ten
days after it attached. If attachment occurs on May 1 and Lender never
perfects its security interest, the transfer takes place on the filing date of the
bankruptcy petition under clause (C). In each instance, the transfer date is
compared to the date when Debtor incurred the debt to determine whether the
transfer was made for antecedent, or pre-existing, debt. If, under the
applicable facts, clause (A) dictates that the transfer date is the attachment
date, then the trustee may have difficulty proving that the transfer was made
to secure repayment of antecedent debt. Generally the difficulty disappears
if Lender files its financing statement more than ten days after attachment, for
then clause (B) (or, in rare circumstances, clause (C)) will dictate a transfer
date after the debt date.
The fifth element requires the trustee to prove that the transfer occurred
when the debtor was insolvent.' Whether the debtor is insolvent is a
question of fact,26 but the trustee's burden is eased somewhat by the statutory
presumption of insolvency during the 90 days immediately preceding the filing
date of the bankruptcy petition.'
automatically when it attaches.").
Under the preference statute, a security interest becomes perfected "when a
creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the
interest of the transferee." 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (1994). Generally a creditor that
perfects its Article Nine security interest enjoys priority over the competing claim of
a subsequent lien creditor. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b). Therefore, a creditor perfected
for Article Nine purposes should be perfected for preference purposes.
25. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1994). The Bankruptcy Code has three definitions of
insolvency: one for municipalities, another for partnerships, and a third for all other
types of debtors (e.g., individuals and corporations). 11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (1994).
26. In re Roblin Indus., Inc., 78 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996).
27. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (1994). If the trustee is attacking a security interest as a
voidable preference, the presumption "imposes on [the secured party] the burden of
going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not shift to
[the secured party] the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion, which
remains throughout the trial upon the [trustee]." FED. R. EVID. 301. See also H. R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 178-79 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6139 ("The
presumption does not shift the burden of proof on the issue of insolvency away from
the trustee. Rather, it is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which state that
the presumption merely requires the party against whom it is directed (in this case, the
transferee of the preference) to go forward to present some evidence to overcome the
presumption. Once he does, the ultimate burden of proof remains with the bankruptcy
19971
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The trustee also must establish that the debtor made the transfer within
the so-called "preference period." Generally, this period is the 90-day period
immediately preceding the filing date of the bankruptcy petition.28 However,
this period can extend back one full year from the filing date29 if the creditor
to whom or for whose benefit the transfer was made is an "insider.1
30
trustee.") (footnote omitted). Occasionally the creditor presents sufficient evidence to
successfully rebut the presumption, forcing the trustee to prove insolvency by a
preponderance of evidence. See, e.g., In re Roblin Indus., Inc., 78 F.3d at 38 (creditor
rebutted presumption, but trustee then proved insolvency); Fokkena v. Winston,
Reuber, Byrne, P.C. (In re Johnson), 189 B.R. 744, 747 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1995)
(creditor rebutted presumption and trustee then failed to prove insolvency); Pembroke
Dev. Corp. v. A.P.L. Window (In re Pembroke Dev. Corp.), 122 B.R. 610, 612
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (creditor rebutted presumption and trustee then failed to prove
insolvency).
28. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (1994). "Controversy exists on how to count [the
90-day period]." Carlson, supra note 18, at 220 n.35. Should one count forward from
the transfer date to the petition date, or backward from the petition date to the transfer
date? Using an example and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a), Professor Carlson persuasively
argues why "[tihe forward-counting method is the superior view." Carlson, supranote
18, at 220 n.35. However, the majority of courts appear to adopt a backward-counting
approach. See Nelson Co. v. Counsel for the Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors
(In re Nelson Co.), 959 F.2d 1260, 1266 n.6 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing cases previously
addressing the issue). See generally Michael T. Andrew, Computation of the
Bankruptcy Preference Period: A Trap for Practitioners, 90 CoM. L.J. 170 (1985).
29. One scholar has noted that "[a]lthough the legislative history contains no clue
indicating how Congress selected this period, the length corresponds to the one year
period during which prepetition fraudulent conveyances are vulnerable to the trustee's
attack under section 548[.]" Vern L. Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable
Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 749 (1985).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1994). "Insider" is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)
(1994) and includes relatives of individual debtors (11 U.S.C. § 101 (3 1)(A)(i) (1994)),
directors and officers of corporate debtors (11 U.S.C. § 101(3 1)(B)(i) and (ii) (1994)),
and general partners of partnership debtors (11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(C)(i) (1994)). As
stated by one authority,
[t]he purpose of the longer preference period is to balance the greater
ability of insider creditors, compared to non-insiders, to procure a
preference. Because of insiders' close relationships with the debtor, they
have greater access to more information about the debtor's financial
position; they "can exert greater influence on the debtor, which causes
insider transactions to be less vulnerable to the market pressures that help
control ann's-length transactions;" and, because of their greater knowledge
and influence, insiders may more easily than other creditors "veil a
potentially preferential transfer, or may even deliberately conceal the
preference."
(Vol. 62
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Finally, the transfer must permit the creditor to receive more than it
otherwise would receive in a bankruptcy liquidation if the transfer were
ignored.3 To illustrate, Bank makes a $1,000,000 unsecured loan to Debtor
on February 1. After Debtor provides Bank with an adverse earnings report,
Debtor agrees on July 1 to collateralize the loan by granting a security interest
in collateral worth approximately $1,200,000. Bank perfects its security
interest by filing a financing statement on July 12. Debtor files its bankruptcy
petition on September 1. To protect its interest in the bankruptcy, Bank will
file a proof of claim.32 Absent any objection from an interested party,
Bank's claim will be "allowed."33 Bank then has a "secured claim" equal to
"the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property"
and an "unsecured claim" equal to the balance.3" If Bank's lien on the
collateral is senior to all other creditors and the collateral still has a value of
$1,200,000, then Bank holds a secured claim equal to the lesser of its unpaid
claim and $1,200,000. If the collateral value has plummeted to $600,000,
then Bank has a $600,000 secured claim and an unsecured claim equal to the
balance of the unpaid debt. Under the priority and distribution schemes of the
Bankruptcy Code, secured claims are paid before unsecured claims.35 If
Debtor's financial statements that accompanied the petition reveal that
Debtor's liabilities exceed its assets, then the trustee can prove that holders of
unsecured claims will not be fully paid. Therefore, the trustee also can prove
EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 6-17, at 301 (citing John Tuskey, The Term "Insider" Within
Section 547(b)(4)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 NoTRE DAME LAW. 726, 729-30
(1982)). See also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc. (In re Erin
Food Serv., Inc.), 980 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir. 1992) ("The one-year preference period
is designed to inhibit insiders-entities normally privy to inside financial information
long before it becomes available to arm's-length creditors-from influencing the
insolvent debtor to deplete its remaining assets for the insider's benefit, to the
detriment of non-insider creditors.").
The trustee does not enjoy the insolvency presumption if the transfer to or for the
benefit of the insider occurred more than ninety days before the petition date. See 11
U.S.C. § 547(t) (1994); Orix Credit Alliance, Inc. v. Harvey (In re Lamar Haddox
Contractor, Inc.), 40 F.3d 118, 121 (5th Cir. 1994); Thompson v. Jonovich (In re Food
& Fibre Protection, Ltd.), 168 B.R. 408, 417 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
31. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1994).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994).
33. 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1994).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994) establishes the priority of expenses and claims, and 11
U.S.C. § 726 (1994) dictates how property of the bankruptcy estate is to be distributed.
Neither section expressly references "secured claims" arising from consensual liens.
"Nevertheless, secured claims are always given top priority as to the assets subject to
the security." EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 7-10, at 461.
19971
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that the security interest permits Bank to recover more than it otherwise would
in a liquidation as long as the collateral has any value that permits at least part
of Bank's claim to be a secured claim.
Even if the trustee proves all seven elements of a preference, a secured
creditor may be able to preserve some or all loan repayments or security
interests from attack by successfully invoking one or more of the eight
exceptions found in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c). 6 As one author has noted,
[tihese exceptions are designed to rescue from attack in bankruptcy those
kinds of transactions, otherwise fitting the definition of a preference, that
are essential to commercial reality and do not offend the purposes of
preference law, or that benefit the ongoing business by helping to keep the
potential bankrupt afloat 7
For purposes of this article, only one exception merits more than a
passing glance." Clause (c)(3), the so-called enabling loan exception,
permits a secured creditor to protect a purchase money security interest 9 if
36. The preface to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994) subjects itself to the exceptions in
subsection (c).
37. Elizabeth A. Orelup, Avoidance ofPreferentialTransfers Underthe Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 65 IOWA L. REV. 209, 233 (1979) (footnote omitted).
38. Readers interested in one or more of the other exceptions may wish to consult
a variety of sources, including EPSTEIN, supra note 21, §§ 6-23 to 6-37; WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 10, §§ 32-5 to 32-6; Carlson, supra note 18, at 279-350;
Countryman, supra note 29, at 758-816; Orelup, supra note 37, at 232-41; Charles J.
Young, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J.
221, 225-37 (1980).
39. Although 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1994) nowhere mentions "purchase money
security interest," a term of art defined in U.C.C. § 9-107, most commentators have
concluded that the subsection protects those types of security interests. See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACICSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON
BANKRUPTcY 472 (2d ed. 1990) ("[Purchase money security interests] are commonly
referred to as 'enabling loans,' because they make possible the acquisition of assets
that a debtor previously did not own .... Section 547(c)(3) reflects . . . special
treatment given to holders of purchase money security interests."); EPSTEIN, supranote
21, § 6-33, at 337 ("The third exception to section 547(b), section 547(c)(3), protects
enabling security interests, better known as purchase-money security interests[.]")
(footnote omitted); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 32-5, at 274 ("A third
exception, in subsection 547(c)(3), applies to purchase money loans."). See also
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Busenlehner (In re Busenlehner), 918 F.2d 928,
930 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Moister v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 500 U.S. 949 (1991) ("Section 547(c)(3) prevents trustees from avoiding
enabling loans[FN#1] that meet certain conditions. FN#1-Enabling loans are
essentially equivalentto the U.C.C.Article Nine's purchase money security interests.");
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it can prove4' by a preponderance of the evidence4' that all seven elements
of the exception are present. First, the security interest must secure repayment
of "new value,"'4 which includes, among other things, "money or money's
worth in goods, services, or new credit."43 Second, the secured party must
extend the new value no earlier than when the security agreement is
executed.' Third, the security agreement must describe the collateral that
is subject to the security interest.4 Fourth, the creditor must extend the new
Rutledge v. First Nat'l Bank of Sallisaw (In re Carson), 119 B.R. 264, 266 (Bankr.
E.D. Okla. 1990) (refusing to apply the exception "since the security interest at issue
is of a non-purchase money character").
Some scholars believethat 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) (1994) only protects the lender-
financed interests described in U.C.C. § 9-107(b) and not the seller-financed interests
described in U.C.C. § 9-107(a). See Irving A. Breitowitz, Article 9 SecurityInterests
as Voidable Preferences,3 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 393-94 n.105, 396 n.108 (1982);
Carlson, supra note 18, at 299; Countryman, supra note 29, at 778. But see EPSTEIN,
supra note 21, § 6-33, at 340. I tend to concur with Epstein's analysis and therefore
will not distinguish between the two types of purchase money security interests in this
article.
40. The secured party has the burden of proving nonavoidability under subsection
(c). See 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1994).
41. See In re P.A. Bergner & Co. Holding Co., 187 B.R. 964,978-79 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1995).
42. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(A) (1994).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (1994).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(A)(i) (1994). Failure to comply with this requirement
occasionally costs a secured party the benefits of the exception. See, e.g.,
Roemelmeyer v. D.M.B. Corp. (In re Berman), 95 B.R. 833 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (denying
availability of enabling loan exception where loan was funded on January 20, 1987,
but security agreement was not executed until February 13, 1987); Allison v. First
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Damon), 34 B.R. 627 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983)
(concluding that creditor could not invoke enabling loan exception because security
agreements were executed on October 8, 1982, long after loans were funded on August
4, 1982, August 24, 1982, and September 13, 1982).
Cf U.C.C. § 9-107 (not requiring security agreement to be executed before or
simultaneously with loan funding in order to qualify for purchase money status);
U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) (requiring the debtor, but not the secured party, to execute the
security agreement). U.C.C. § 9-107 does not require the purchase money security
interest to be evidenced by a written security agreement. However, unless the secured
party either retains possession of the collateral or controls investment property, the
purchase money creditor has no enforceable security interest absent a written security
agreement. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(A)(i) (1994). Cf U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a) (requiring
description of collateral in security agreement).
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value to the bankrupt debtor under that security agreement.4 6 Fifth, the
secured party must extend the new value in order to enable the bankrupt
debtor to acquire the collateral. Sixth, the debtor must use the new value
to acquire the collateral.4 And seventh, the secured party must perfect its
security interest no later than the twentieth day after the debtor first
possesses49 the collateral. °
46. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(A)(ii) (1994).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(A)(iii) (1994).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(A)(iv) (1994).
49. "The term 'possession' in (c)(3)(B) is defined according to its usual and
ordinary meaning, that is, physical or manual control." EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 6-33
at 339 n.9. Determining when the debtor first possessed the collateral has been the
subject of occasional litigation. See, e.g., Scott v. McArthur Say. & Loan Co. (In re
Winnett), 102 B.R. 635 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989); Logan v. Columbus Postal
Employees Credit Union, Inc. (In re Trott), 91 B.R. 808 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) (1994). Before the Reform Act, the statute required
the secured party to perfect its security interest within ten days after the debtor first
possessed the collateral. Before enactment of the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-333, 98 Stat. 333 (1984), the statute
required the secured party to perfect its security interest before the tenth day following
attachment.
The secured party occasionally loses the protection afforded by the (c)(3)
exception because it failed to timely perfect its security interest. See, e.g., Gibson v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 104 B.R. 432 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (possession
on August 28; perfection on October 9); Bank One, Dayton, N.A. v. Bavely (In re
Phillips), 103 B.R. 893 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (possession on January 11; perfection
on January 27).
Creditors that are unable to preserve their purchase money security interests under
the (c)(3) exception after untimely perfecting their interests frequently attempt to
invoke the protection afforded by the "contemporaneous exchange" exception of clause
(c)(1). However, most courts and scholars agree that clause (c)(1) cannot excuse
untimely perfection of a purchase money security interest. See, e.g., Pongetti v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Locklin), 101 F.3d 435, 442-44 (5th Cir.
1996); Wachovia Bank and Trust Co., N.A. v. Bringle (In re Holder), 892 F.2d 29,30-
31 (4th Cir. 1989); Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Baker (In re Tressler), 771 F.2d 791,
793-94 (3d Cir. 1985); Gower v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Davis), 734 F.2d 604,
605-07 (11th Cir. 1984); Valley Bank v. Vance (In re Vance), 721 F.2d 259, 260-62
(9th Cir. 1983); Westenhoefer v. PNC Bank (In re Smallwood), 204 B.R. 519, 520
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997); EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 6-33, at 338 ("Section (c)(3), with
its peculiar procedural requirements, was designed especially for purchase-money
security interests, and therefore (c)(1) is inapplicable to them.") (footnote omitted); id.
at 340 ("[flf (c)(3) is applicable because the transfer involves an enabling security
interest, (c)(1) is not alternatively available should the requirements of (c)(3) not be
met."). But see Jahn v. First Tennessee Bank of Chattanooga (In re Bumette), 14 B.R.
795, 802-03 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) (dicta); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
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If the trustee satisfies its burden of proof under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) and
the secured party cannot successfully invoke any of the exceptions in 11
U.S.C. § 547(c), the trustee "may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the
property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property"
from the secured party."' The usual result of a successful preference attack
against a security interest is the removal of the lien from the collateral. The
value of the now-unencumbered assets may then become a factor in fashioning
an acceptable plan of reorganization. Alternatively, if the debtor is seeking
liquidation, the assets will be converted to cash and the proceeds will be
distributed in accordance with applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
And in either a reorganization or a liquidation, the victimized creditor will
find itself eating table scraps out of the trough with the other unsecured
creditors, rather than feasting at the head table with creditors holding secured
claims.
II. SAVED BY GRACE: CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE AND STATE LAW
A. The Case Law
The transfer date provisions of the preference statute mesh somewhat
unevenly with state commercial law principles. In general, a security interest
transfer occurs on the date of its perfection, unless the security interest is
perfected within ten days after attachment, in which case the earlier attachment
date is the transfer date.52 For preference purposes, a security interest is
perfected when "a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien
that is superior to the interest of the [secured party]." '53 Under state law, a
secured party occasionally can perfect its security interest after attachment but
still enjoy priority over a competing judicial lien by satisfying local perfection
requirements within the grace period provided by the applicable state statute.
One question that has arisen is this: If a secured party fails to perfect its
security interest within the post-attachment grace period under 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(2) but timely perfects its interest within a longer grace period under
state law, may the secured party rely on the longer state period to prove the
Martella (In re Martella), 22 B.R. 649,651-52 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); H. R. REP. No.
95-595, at 373 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6329 ("Subsection (c)
contains exceptions to the trustee's avoiding power. If a creditor can qualify under
any one of the exceptions, then he is protected to that extent. If he can qualify under
several, he is protected by each to the extent he can qualify under each.").
51. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1994).
52. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(e)(2)(A)-(e)(2)(B) (1994).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (1994).
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transfer occurred on the earlier attachment date rather than the subsequent
perfection date (which may not only frustrate the trustee's ability to prove that
the transfer occurred during the preference period5' and secured repayment
of antecedent debt" but also improve the secured party's ability to satisfy the
"timely perfection" requirement of the enabling loan exception 6)? Or does
the secured party's failure to perfect its interest within the shorter grace period
of the preference statute result in the transfer occurring on the perfection date,
even though by complying with state law the secured party enjoyed priority
over a lien creditor as of an earlier date? Several courts have confronted the
issue, reaching different results. And even those that reach the same result
frequently travel different roads. A summary of the major cases follows-all
of which arose before 11 U.S.C. § 547 was amended by the Reform Act.
In Jahn v. First Tennessee Bank of Chattanooga (In re Burnette),s7 the
trustee attacked a purchase money security interest in a pick-up truck that did
not become perfected until twenty days after the bankrupt debtor created the
security interest and took possession of the vehicle. 8 The creditor, relying
on the twenty-day grace period found in Tennessee's version of U.C.C. § 9-
301(2), argued that its perfection related back to the attachmentand possession
date, and because this date also was the date when the debtor incurred the
debt, the trustee could not prove the antecedency requirement of 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(2).5 9  As phrased by the court, "[t]he problem in this case is
determining how the twenty day grace period of U.C.C. § 9-301(2) relates to
the preference statute, particularly in light of the preference statute's own ten
day grace period."'
The bankruptcy court observed that the predecessor preference statute,
section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, made state grace periods expressly relevant,
unlike section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.6' Furthermore, 11 U.S.C.
§ 546(b) provides that the rights and powers under certain provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code are subject to applicable state grace periods; noticeably
absent is any reference to a trustee's rights and powers under 11 U.S.C.
§ 547.62 Therefore, the court concluded that it was "evident that Congress
did not intend for state grace periods to be relevant under the preference
54. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1994).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1994).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) (1994).
57. 14 B.R. 795 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981).
58. Id at 796.
59. Id at 796-97.
60. Id at 797.
61. Id. at 797-800.
62. Id at 800.
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statute. There was to be a uniform [ten-day] rule throughout the nation."'63
However, the court was not convinced that Congress manifested this intent to
the exclusion of other interpretations when it stated in 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(1)(B) that a security interest is perfected when a creditor cannot
acquire a superior judicial lien. In the court's mind, "perfection" could refer
either to an act (such as filing a financing statement) or a status enjoyed over
a period of time.' On one hand, if "perfection" related to an act, an
interpretation that the court admitted was consistent with Congressional
intent,65 then perfection (and the date of transfer) would not occur until that
act happened (thereby enabling the trustee to prove antecedency). On the
other hand, if "perfection" referred to any period of time during which a
creditor could not obtain a superior judicial lien, then a secured party that
timely acted within the state grace period would be "perfected" as of
attachment (thereby decreasing the likelihood that the trustee could prove
antecedency). The court found both interpretations consistent with the
wording of the preference statute but found the latter definition "more
reasonable" and "less troublesome" than the former, under which "the court
must consider the facts from an earlier perspective, rather than as they turned
out."'  Therefore, because the secured party had timely perfected its security
interest under Tennessee law, the interest was perfected as of the time of
attachment, preventing the trustee from proving that the transfer was made to
secure repayment of antecedent debt.67
Two years later, another bankruptcy court in Tennessee confronted the
same issue but reached a different result in Waldschmidt v. Ford Motor Credit
Co. (n re Murray).68 The court observed that 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) subjects
the trustee's rights and powers under certain Bankruptcy Code provisions to
applicable state law; yet, 11 U.S.C. § 547 is not one of the referenced
provisions. Therefore, the court concluded that Tennessee's version of U.C.C.
§ 9-301(2) was inapplicable.69 To support its conclusion, the court ignored
the result of In re Burnette but relied on its determination that a comparison
of section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act and section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code
63. Id at 801.
64. Id. at 801 n.7.
65. Id at 801.
66. Id.
67. Id at 802. The court also held that the creditor could preserve the transfer
under either the enabling loan exception or the contemporaneous exchange exception.
Id at 802-03. This latter holding is a minority view, as most courts have held that
purchase money creditors cannot avail themselves of the contemporaneous exchange
exception. See supra note 50.
68. 27 B.R. 445 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983).
69. Id at 448.
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 62 Mo. L. Rev. 61 1997
MISSOURILAW REVIEW
revealed Congress intended a uniform grace period. The court expressed
reluctance to interpret the interplay of state law and the Bankruptcy Code in
a manner inconsistent with the uniformity Congress intended. "Although the
state legislature has discretion to establish grace periods relevant for
determining priorities in ordinary commercial transactions, such grace periods
are not controlling in the bankruptcy context for determining whether a
preference is avoidable.""0 Because the creditor did not timely perfect its
security interest within ten days following attachment, the creditor could not
avail itself of the benefits of 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A). This permitted the
trustee to prove antecedency, the only disputed element of its preference
action.7
In In re Scoviac,72 a bankruptcy court held that a purchase money
creditor could not rely on the more liberal provisions of Florida law to
overcome its failure to perfect its security interest within ten days after
attachment. "[The Florida] grace period is not a relation back provision which
controls the date of transfer. Rather such date is controlled specifically and
solely by § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code.... Adoption of the state statutory
priority provisions, including [Florida's version of U.C.C. § 9-301(2)] would
wreak havoc on the stability engendered by § 547(e)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy
Code."73
A federal appellate court confronted the issue for the first time in Howard
Thornton Ford, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick (In re Hamilton).74 The court phrased the
70. Id at 451.
71. Id at 447-48. The court also held that untimely perfection prevented the
creditor from successfully preserving the transfer under the enabling loan exception.
Id. at 448. The creditor, relying on In re Burnette and other cases, argued that the
contemporaneous exchange exception protected its security interest from attack, Id.
at 448-49. The court disagreed. "The better view and the majority view is that
§ 547(c)(3) is the exclusive exception available to protect enabling loans from
avoidance." Id. at 449.
72. 74 B.R. 635 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1987).
73. Id at 637-38. Unlike the typical case, in which the creditor relies on state law
to challenge the trustee's ability to prove antecedency, the creditor in In re Scoviac
attempted to use state law to move the transfer outside the 90-day preference period.
The debtor filed her Chapter 7 petition on July 17, 1986. The security interest
attached, or became enforceable, on April 12, 1986-a date outside the preference
period. However, the creditor did not perfect its interest until April 25, 1986-a date
within the preference period and more than ten days after attachment but within
Florida's statutory 15-day period. Id. at 636.
The court also held that the creditor's untimely perfection prevented it from
relying on the enabling loan exception, and the purchase money status of its security
interest made the contemporaneous exchange exception unavailable. Id. at 637.
74. 892 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1990).
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question before it as "whether the Texas UCC 20 day grace period or the
Federal Bankruptcy § 547(c) 10 day grace period for perfection of a security
interest in personal property applies."7 5 The court answered its question with
very little original analysis. It noted that the bankruptcy courts in In re
Burnette and In re Scoviac had reached opposite results in similar litigation. 6
In conclusory fashion, the court then simply stated: "In this choice we prefer
Scoviac over Burnette as do treatises commentators."7 7
Within a year, the issue again presented itself before another federal
appellate court in General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Busenlehner (In
re Busenlehner).8 Creditor GMAC conceded that all elements of 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(b) were present but argued that it could preserve its purchase money
security interest in the debtor's vehicle under the enabling loan exception of
11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3).7 1 The trustee disagreed, contending that because
GMAC did not perfect its security interest until April 13, 1988, GMAC could
not prove that its security interest was perfected within ten days after the
bankrupt debtors purchased and first possessed the car on March 31, 1988, as
required by 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B). 80  GMAC responded by citing
applicable Georgia law that permitted perfection to relate back to the creation
of the interest if the creditor completed the steps for perfection within twenty
days of creation.8 Because GMAC perfected its security interest within the
75. Id at 1230. The court relied on the Texas version of U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2) and
9-312(4) for finding a 20-day period. As the preference statute defines perfection in
the context of a priority dispute between a secured creditor and ajudicial lien creditor,
the court's reliance on U.C.C. § 9-312(4), which resolves priority disputes between two
secured creditors (one of which is claiming purchase money status), is misplaced. Cf
U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (resolving competing claims between a lien creditor and a purchase
money creditor).
76. In re Hamilton, 892 F.2d at 1234-35.
77. Id at 1235. More than one article has criticized the Hamilton court for its
conclusory analysis. See, e.g., Alvin C. Harrell, Note, Bankruptcy Code Preempts
State Law Grace Period, 46 CoNSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 60, 69, 75 (1992) (referring
to the "skeletal conclusory statements" and "simplistic analysis" in the opinion); Alvin
C. Harrell, et al., Update on U.C.C.-Other Law Conflicts, 45 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q.
REP. 335, 343 (1991) (accusing the court of "ignoring . . . important issues and
oversimplifying the nature of the controversy"); id. at 343 n.107 ("More significantly,
the Hamilton opinion as a whole is not a model of clarity of analysis.").
78. 918 F.2d 928 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Moister v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 500 U.S. 949 (1991).
79. Moisterv. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Busenlehner), 98 B.R. 600,
601 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989).
80. Id, at 600-01.
81. Id at 601. Rather than rely on Georgia's version of U.C.C. § 9-301, GMAC
invoked the Georgia statute governing perfection of security interests in motor vehicles,
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twenty-day period, GMAC argued that its security interest was perfected as of
March 31, 1988, a date that permitted GMAC to successfully invoke the
protection of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)." The bankruptcy court disagreed with
GMAC and granted the trustee's motion for summary judgment.83 The
district court reversed on different grounds.' On appeal, the court observed
under which a security interest "is perfected as of the time of its creation if the
delivery [of applicable paperwork] is completed within 20 days thereafter; otherwise,
as of the date of the delivery [of applicable paperwork] to the commissioner." Id.
82. Id
83. The bankruptcy court offered three reasons for its decision. First, it noted that
Congress had shortened the grace period from 21 days (under the Bankruptcy Act) to
10 days under the Bankruptcy Code. "Therefore, allowing the twenty-day perfection
period found in [the Georgia statute] to control in the context of preference litigation
would undermine Congress' intent in setting the ten-day grace period." Id at 602.
Second, the court relied on the factually similar In re Murray, 27 B.R. 445 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1983), in which the Tennessee bankruptcy court had held that timely
perfection under state law did not necessarily protect a creditor from a preference
challenge because preference actions operated under different rules. In reBusenlehner,
98 B.R. at 602. And third, the court noted that a trustee is subject to state-created,
relation-back provisions only in certain situations described in 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)
(1988); noticeably absent is any cross-reference to the preference statute. Id.
84. The district court, relying on the counting scheme of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a),
held that GMAC had complied with the timeliness requirement of the enabling loan
exception. In re Busenlehner, 918 F.2d at 929-30. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a) provides:
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or
allowed by these rules or by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made
applicable by these rules, by the local rules, by order of court, or by any
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the
designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day
of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday, or, when the act to be done is the filing of a
paper in court, a day on which weather or other conditions have made the
clerk's office inaccessible, in which event the period runs until the end of
the next day which is not one of the aforementioned days. When the period
of time prescribed or allowed is less than 8 days, intermediate Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. As used
in this rule and in Rule 5001(c), "legal holiday" includes New Year's Day,
Birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr., Washington's Birthday, Memorial Day,
Independence Day, Labor Day, ColumbusDay, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving
Day, Christmas Day, and any other day appointed as a holiday by the
President or the Congress of the United States, or by the state in which the
court is held.
It is not obvious from reading the rule how the district court concluded that GMAC,
by perfecting its interest on April 13 (thirteen calendar days after the debtors purchased
and possessed the vehicle), satisfied the 10-day requirement of the enabling loan
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that under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) a security interest transfer is perfected
when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is
superior to the interest of the secured party. Under Georgia law, GMAC's
interest in the automobile enjoyed priority over any judicial lien as GMAC
had perfected its interest within twenty days of creation and thus enjoyed the
benefits of the relation-back statute. Therefore, GMAC's interest became
perfected under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) as of March 31, which allowed
GMAC to qualify for the protection of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3).8 The court
concluded with comments worth quoting:
This conclusion is supported by the policies underlying preference law.
The goal of the drafters of this provision of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform
Act was to bring preference law "more into conformity with commercial
practices and the Uniform Commercial Law." Creditors are encouraged by
our legal system to secure their loans. The general message to creditors is
that should they follow state commercial law their secured loans will be
protected in bankruptcy.
By limiting the effect of state relation-back statutes in bankruptcy,
legitimate commercial practices are penalized. To hold for the Trustee in
this case may be beneficial in that it creates a larger estate to pay
administrative expenses and unsecured claims. But this benefit is out-
weighed in that the original enabling loan increased the size of the estate.
The creditor, moreover, lent the money in the expectation that the creditor's
compliance with state law was sufficient to protect the loan. Debtors
should not be given the ability to surprise and upset established commercial
practices by filing for bankruptcy and avoiding this otherwise acceptable
security interest. 6
In late 1991, two bankruptcy courts from the same Oklahoma district
reached contrary results after addressing the interplay between the state's 15-
day grace period and the Bankruptcy Code's 10-day grace period. In
Beaumont v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation (In re Power),87 Chief
Judge Covey concluded that the creditor's timely perfection under state law
permitted the creditor's perfection to relate back to the time of attachment,
preventing the trustee from proving that the security interest had been
conveyed to secure repayment of antecedent debt. "The Bankruptcy Code
does not say the physical act of perfection has to occur within ten days; it just
exception. The district court's opinion is not reported.
85. In re Busenlelmer, 918 F.2d at 930-31. Why this conclusion also did not
prevent the trustee from proving that the security interest was conveyed for antecedent
debt, as required by the statute, is unclear.
86. Id at 931 (citation omitted).
87. 133 B.R. 242 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991).
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states that the lien must be perfected within ten days. Here, that requirement
was met."8 Bankruptcy Judge Wilson disagreed in Woodson v. City Finance
Company (In re Holloway).89 In his view, "the natural reading of
§ 547(e)(1)(B) is that perfection occurs when the last act required by State law
to acquire the desired status is performed. The contrary interpretation that
§ 547(e)(1)(B) refers not to the real-world doing of an act but to a fictional
period of time is an ingenious, but strained and unnatural, reading of the
statute."'  Judge Wilson reviewed the contrary holdings of In re Burnette,
In re Busenlehner, and In re Power and concluded that those decisions
erroneously interpreted the phrase "within 10 days" in 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)
to mean "within 10 days plus some variable period of time as may be added
thereto by State laws." According to Judge Wilson, "[s]uch a reading is not
supported by either the language of the statute or its legislative history; and
does not carry out the intent of the statute and Congress. This Court finds
such authorities unpersuasive, and declines to follow them."
9
'
Without citing either In re Power or In re Holloway, but relying heavily
on In re Busenlehner, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, applying Oklahoma law, ruled in favor of the creditor and against the
trustee in Webb v. General Motors .4cceptance Corporation (In re Hesser).'
The appellate court first noted that a security interest becomes perfected under
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire
a judicial lien that is superior to the secured party's interest, a determination
made under Oklahoma law.' Although the creditor did not take action
necessary to complete perfection until May 1, 1990, the governing statute
permitted perfection to relate back to the execution date of the security
agreement, April 16, 1990. 9' Therefore, according to the court, this earlier
date was the day on which a creditor on a simple contract could not acquire
a superior judicial lien and thus was the day of transfer under 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(2).9" As this date also was the purchase date, the transfer did not
secure repayment of antecedent debt, as required by 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2).9 6
88. Id at 244.
89. 132 B.R. 771 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991).
90. Id at 774.
91. Id at 775.
92. 984 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1993).
93. Id at 348.
94. Id at 347.
95. Id at 348-49.
96. Id at 349. The court's statement may be overbroad because under certain
circumstances a trustee might be able to prove antecedency even if the security interest
arises on the same date that the debtor incurs the debt. For example, Justice Holmes
once concluded that a creditor received a preferential transfer by making an unsecured
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And even if the trustee proved antecedency, the creditor could successfully
invoke the protection afforded by 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3). 97  The court
concluded its opinion by reiterating most of the above-quoted passage from
In re Busenlehner to support its decision.98
The bankruptcy appellate panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit entered the fray in 1994 in Long v. Joe Romania Chevrolet,
Inc. (In re Loken),9' a case in which a purchase money dealer who did not
perfect its security interest until twelve days after the debtor purchased and
possessed the car argued that 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) preserved its property
interest from preference attack because it had timely perfected its interest
within the 20-day grace period under Oregon's version of U.C.C. § 9-
301(2)."°  The bankruptcy court deferred analysis under 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(3)"1 and, relying on In re Burnette, concluded that application of
the Oregon statute prevented the trustee from proving that the dealer's
property interest secured repayment of antecedent debt."~ The bankruptcy
appellate panel reversed the lower court's decision for two reasons. First,
unlike other courts that had struggled with whether the term "perfection" as
used in 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) referred to a moment in time or a status, this court
found no ambiguity. 03 It noted that under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1), a security
interest is perfected when a judicial lienholder cannot acquire a superior
interest; if at any time a judicial lienholder can obtain superior rights, then the
security interest is not yet perfected.M
Essentially, under Section 547(e)(1), the court must determine the moment
in time when a judicial lien creditor is barred from obtaining superior
rights.... We hold that a creditor on a simple contract is barred from
acquiring a judicial lien superior to the interest of the transferee when the
loan at 10:00 a.m. and then demanding and accepting securities between 2:00 p.m. and
3:00 p.m. that afternoon following the sudden decline in the market value of the
borrower's assets. See National City Bank of New York v. Hotchkiss, 231 U.S. 50
(1913). See also Breitowitz, supra note 39, at 413 (acknowledging that while the
contemporaneous exchange exception "somewhat mitigates the rigors of a literal
definition of antecedence," the term "[a]ntecedent debt is given no statutory definition
and presumably any delay.., would fit the meaning of the term.").
97. In re Hesser, 984 F.2d 345, 349 (10th Cir. 1993).
98. Id
99. 175 B.R. 56 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).
100. Long v. Joe Romania Chevrolet, Inc. (In re Loken), 156 B.R. 660, 661
(Bankr. D. Or. 1993).
101. Id
102. Id at 664.
103. In re Loken, 175 B.R. 56, 61 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).
104. Id at 60-61.
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transferee takes the last step required by state law to perfect its security
interest. Until that last step is taken, other creditors could potentially obtain
superior rights. Until this last step, it is not possible to say that other
creditors "cannot" obtain superior rights."°
Second, the court believed that the legislative history of preference law,
including not-yet-applicable changes made to 11 U.S.C. § 547 by the Reform
Act, indicated Congressional intent to create a uniform rule in all jurisdictions.
This intent would be frustrated if different state grace periods were relevant
under the preference statute.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit traveled a
slightly different analytical path to reach the same result in Fitzgerald v. First
Security Bank of Idaho (In re Walker), °7 a case in which the creditor took
the steps necessary to perfect its security interest outside the ten-day period of
11 U.S.C. § 547(e) but within Idaho's thirty-day statute. The creditor, relying
on the state statute, argued that its security interest was perfected as of the
date of creation and possession, a fact that prevented the trustee from proving
that the property interest secured repayment of antecedent debt and,
alternatively, allowed the creditor to exempt the security interest from attack
under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)."' Unlike the bankruptcy appellate panel in
In re Loken, the bankruptcy court found the term "perfection" as used in 11
U.S.C. § 547(e) ambiguous and believed the two common constructions-one
focusing on a final act, and the other emphasizing status-were both
plausible."° However, relying on legislative history surrounding 11 U.S.C.
§ 547, scholarly commentary favoring a uniform grace period, and Bankruptcy
Code provisions, the court adopted the former interpretation."' It reviewed
contrary case law but concluded those opinions "ignore legislative intent and
engage in inappropriate policy judgments about the operation of the
Code." '' The court therefore concluded that because the creditor perfected
its security interest outside the ten-day period of 11 U.S.C. § 547(e), the
trustee could prove antecedency and set aside the interest as a voidable
preference."' The federal district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's
105. Id. at 62.
106. Id at 62-63.
107. 77 F.3d 322 (9th Cir. 1996).
108. Fitzgerald v. First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. (In re Walker), 161 B.R.
484, 487 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993).
I9 d at 493.
110. Id at 493-97.
111. Id at 500.
112. Id at 501.
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decision."' The creditor suffered a similar fate on appeal. "The Code gives
10 days, not 30, in which to perfect a transfer. In bankruptcy, the Code
trumps the law of the state. The Bank's lien was not perfected in 10 days.
The state's relation-back provision cannot save it.""' 4
B. Congress Responds-And Resolves Most
(But Not All) Of The Conflict
As illustrated by the foregoing cases, historically a purchase money
creditor that perfected its interest more than ten days after the debtor first
possessed the collateral but within a longer state grace period often found
itself the victim of a preference attack. That likelihood diminished greatly in
1994 when Congress, in an effort to conform the preference statute to the
more liberal practice found in most states,"' amended 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(3)(B) by extending the post-possession period during which purchase
money creditors may timely perfect their security interests from ten to twenty
days," 6 a period that parallels the grace period found in U.C.C. § 9-301(2)
as enacted in most states.1 7 As a result of this amendment, many purchase
113. Fitzgerald v. First Security Bank of Idaho (In re Walker), 178 B.R. 497 (D.
Idaho 1994).
114. In re Walker, 77 F.3d at 323.
115. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 45 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3340, 3354.
116. See Reform Act § 203(1).
117. See U.C.C. § 9-301, 3A U.L.A. 14-15 (1992), 4-5 (Supp. 1996) (indicating
that the following states have adopted a 20-day grace period in their respective version
of U.C.C. § 9-301(2): Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). Florida provides a 15-day
period and Arkansas and Idaho provide a 21-day period. Id Three states not
mentioned in the above source also provide grace periods longer than 10 days. See
CAL. COMM. CODE § 9301(2) (West Supp. 1996) (20 days); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-9-
301(2) (1994) (15 days); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-9-301(2) (1992) (20 days).
Article Nine is being redrafted. The drafting committee intends to amend the
official text of U.C.C. § 9-301(2), which will be recodified as U.C.C. § 9-315(f), by
extending the grace period to 20 days. See Uniform CommercialCode RevisedArticle
9-Secured Transactions; Sales ofAccounts and Chattel Paper (February 1997 draft)
§ 9-315(f) ("Except as otherwise provided in section 9-316 [which protects certain
buyers], if a secured party files a financing statement with respect to a purchase money
security interest before or within 20 days after the debtor receives delivery of the
1997]
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money creditors now are able to preserve their security interests from attack
under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) even if the trustee proves every element of its
case, including the antecedent nature of the debt. Some scholars believe that
any continuing conflict between state and federal law has been rendered moot
by the amendment." 8 Perhaps the number of potential conflicts has been
greatly reduced, but the potential for some conflict still exists for various
reasons.
First, twojurisdictions-Arkansas and Idaho-have amendedtheir version
of U.C.C. § 9-301(2) to provide a purchase money creditor with a 21-day
filing period."' Mindful that a federal appellate court has already held that
Idaho's more creditor-friendly motor vehicle statute cannot preempt federal
law, 2° the possibility for any present conflict between the federal 20-day
period and a more liberal period under a state's version of U.C.C. § 9-301(2)
seems to exist only in the unique situation where a purchase money creditor
governed by Arkansas law perfects its security interest on the twenty-first day
after the debtor takes possession of the collateral. However, the possibility
always exists that state legislatures might revise their versions of U.C.C. § 9-
301(2) by extending the grace period beyond twenty days, making dissonant
the harmony that now exists between federal and state law, just as former
amendments to the then-existing ten-day grace period did.
Furthermore, U.C.C. § 9-301 is not the exclusive law that dictates priority
between a purchase money creditor and a lien creditor. In many instances, as
illustrated by the foregoing cases, the governing law is a state's motor vehicle
statute.'' And the potential for conflict between 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) and
motor vehicle law is great for at least two reasons. First, some states provide
more than a 20-day grace period to a creditor taking a security interest in a
motor vehicle." Second, in most states the applicable grace period found
collateral, the security interest takes priority over the rights of a buyer, lessee, or lien
creditor which arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of
filing.").
118. See, e.g., WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 32-4, at 258 ("The 1994
amendments to section 547 diminished this problem to insignificance.").
119. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-301(2) (Michie Supp. 1995); IDAHO CODE § 28-
9-301(2) (1995).
120. See In re Walker, 77 F.3d 322, 322 (9th Cir. 1996).
121. Article Nine expressly states that the filing of a financing statement is not
necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to a certificate
of title statute unless the property is inventory in the hands of the debtor. See U.C.C.
§ 9-302(3)(b).
122. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-14-805 (Michie 1994) (30 days); 625 ILL. COM.
STAT. ANN. 5/3-202(b) (West 1993) (21 days); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 301.600(2) (West
1994) (30 days); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-1a-605 (1993) (30 days); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46.2-639 (Michie 1996) (30 days); W. VA. CODE § 17A-4A4(a) (1996) (60 days).
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in the motor vehicle statutes begins running on a day other than the date when
the debtor receives possession of the vehicle-the trigger date under 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(3)(B). Of the twenty-nine states that incorporate a grace period into
their respective motor vehicle statute, only Florida begins its grace period on
the possession date.'3 Because Florida's period of fifteen days 24 is less
than the federal period, no conflict will result." However, potential
conflict exists in many of the other twenty-eight states.
The grace period in five states begins on the execution date of paperwork
required to be delivered to the appropriate official. 26 In those transactions
where the purchase money creditor is a dealer holding the certificate of
title,27 the creditor should be able to complete the necessary paperwork
before the debtor takes possession of the car and then file the paperwork with
the appropriate official within twenty days, avoiding any conflict between state
and federal law. However, it is foreseeable that a dealer might fail to submit
the paperwork within twenty days of the debtor's possession, yet act within
the applicable state grace period, creating a potential conflict between state
and federal law.' And the likelihood for a potential conflict is enhanced
Idaho recently amended its grace period from 30 days to 20 days. See IDAHO CODE
§ 49-510 (1994 [30 days] & 1996 Supp. [20 days]).
Presumably, any future conflict involving the Idaho or Missouri statute would be
resolved by applying the federal grace period. See In re Walker, 77 F.3d at 322
(Idaho law); Barnes v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Ross), 193 B.R. 902
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996) (Missouri law); Fink v. Fidelity Fin. Sews., Inc. (In re
Beasley), 183 B.R. 857 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995), af'd, 102 F.3d 334 (8th Cir. 1996)
(Missouri law). Occasionally, however, courts examining the same state statute reach
inconsistent results. Compare In re Bumette, 14 B.R. at 795 (concluding Tennessee
grace period trumped federal grace period) with In re Murray, 27 B.R. at 445 (holding
federal grace period, not Tennessee grace period, applied).
123. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.27(3)(b) (West 1990).
124. Id
125. This assumes that the bankruptcy trustee does not advocate adoption of the
narrower state period, which no doubt would accelerate the temporary conversion of
the creditor into a Bankruptcy Code disciple! For such a case, see In re Smallwood,
204 B.R. 519 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997).
126. ALASKA STAT. § 28.10.391(b) (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-325(E)
(1995 & Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-14-805 (Michie 1994); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47, § 1 10(A)(2) (West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-la-605 (1993).
127. A manufacturer that sells vehicles to a dealer on credit can surrender the
certificates of title to the dealer and still obtain a perfected security interest in the
vehicles by filing a financing statement. See U.C.C. § 9-302(3)(b) (making filing
provisions applicable to collateral otherwise subject to certificate-of-title laws if the
collateral is inventory in the hands of the debtor).
128. The conflict is more likely to occur in Arkansas and Utah, which provide a
30-day grace period, than in Alaska and Arizona, which provide only a 10-day grace
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in the many transactions where a non-dealer holds the certificate of title and
releases it to the purchase money creditor only after receiving full payment of
the seller's loan. In these transactions, a delay may exist between when the
buyer takes possession of the car (which commences the federal period) and
when the purchase money creditor receives the certificate of title from the
seller's creditor and is able to complete the necessary paperwork (which
begins the state period). As the delay increases, so, too, does the likelihood
that the purchase money creditor will perfect its security interest within the
applicable state grace period but outside the twenty-day period of 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(3)(B).
Three states start their respective grace period on the execution date of
the security agreement.'29 In the normal transaction the creditor requires the
debtor to execute the security agreement before surrendering possession of the
vehicle. Therefore, the potential for a conflict between state and federal law
should be nonexistent because no grace period in any of these states exceeds
twenty days.' 31 It is not inconceivable, however, that a debtor occasionally
may not execute the security agreement until it has possessed the car for one
or more days, because either (i) the seller failed to obtain an executed security
agreement before closing the sale or (ii) the buyer possessed the vehicle for
one or more days (e.g., a "test drive") before deciding to purchase the vehicle.
This reversal of the normal order of activity may increase the possibility that
the creditor will timely perfect its interest under state law, yet fail to act
timely under federal law.
The purchase date triggers the 30-day grace period in Virginia and the
60-day grace period in West Virginia.' Because each state's grace period
exceeds twenty days, the possibility exists that a creditor will perfect its
interest outside the federal period but within the state period.
And in eighteen states the grace period starts on the attachment date. 2
period. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.10.391(b) (1994); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-
325(E) (1995 & Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-14-805 (Michie 1994); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 41-la-605 (1993). Because Oklahoma provides a 20-day grace period,
the potential for conflict exists only if the debtor receives delivery of the vehicle
before the required forms are executed. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 11 10(A)(2)
(West Supp. 1997).
129. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-202 (Michie Supp. 1996) (ten days); N.C. GEM.
STAT. § 20-58.2 (1993) (twenty days); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.12.095(2) (West
1987) ("eight department business days").
130. See supra note 129.
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-639 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 17A-4A-4(a)
(1996).
132. See ALA. CODE § 32-8-61(b) (1989) (20 days); CONN. GEM. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-185(a) (West 1987) (20 days); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-3-50(b) (Michie 1994 &
Supp. 1996) (20 days); IDAHO CODE § 49-510 (1994 [30 days] & Supp. 1996 [20
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In the typical situation the debtor takes delivery on the same date that the
security interest attaches, making it rare that the creditor would satisfy state,
but not federal, law except in the two states with grace periods longer than
twenty days.' However, a remote, but not impossible, opportunity for such
a scenario to materialize exists in the other sixteen states if the security
interest does not attach (e.g., the debtor fails to execute the security
agreement3 ) until after the debtor possesses the vehicle.
As Congress did not completely eliminate all possible conflict between
state and federal grace periods by amending 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B), an
analysis of the reasons offered by state law proponents and their federal law
counterparts may be helpful to future courts that confront the conflict. Such
analysis follows.
C. Resolving Future Conflicts: Who Has The Better Argument?
As noted by several courts, the legislative history of the preference statute
indicates that Congress intended for the single, uniform period of 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e) to control. 13 The predecessor statute to 11 U.S.C. § 547, section
days]); 625 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/3-202(b) (West 1993) (21 days); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 186A.195(5) (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (10 days); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 29-A, § 702(3) (West 1996) (20 days); MD. CODE ANN. TRANsP. § 13-202(b)(2)
(1992) (10 days); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90D, § 21 (West 1993) (10 days);
MimN. STAT. ANN. § 168A.17(2) (West 1986) (10 days); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 301.600(2) (West 1994) (30 days); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 261:24(11) (1993) (20
days); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 2118(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 1996) (10 days); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 31-3.1-19(b) (1995) (20 days); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-19-630 (Law. Co-
op. 1991) (10 days); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-3-126(b)(2) (Supp. 1996) (20 days); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 2042(b) (1987) (20 days); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 342.19(2) (West
1991) (10 days).
133. See 625 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/3-202(b) (West 1993) (21 days); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 301.600(2) (West 1994) (30 days). Idaho recently amended its grace period
from 30 days to 20 days. See supra note 122. As noted earlier, precedent suggests
that a dispute involving federal law and Idaho or Missouri law will be resolved in
favor of federal law. See supra note 122. The trustee also has precedent on its side
in Alabama. See In re Locklin, 101 F.3d 435 (5th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, courts
have been known to depart from precedent. See supra note 122.
134. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (requiring, as a predicate to attachment, the debtor to
execute a security agreement unless the secured party either possessesthe collateral or
is in control of investment property).
135. See, e.g., In re Locklin, 101 F.3d 435, 442 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Loken, 175
B.R. 56, 62-63 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994); In re Walker, 161 B.R. 484, 493-94 (Bankr.
Idaho 1993); In re Holloway, 132 B.R. 771, 774-75 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991); In re
Burnette, 14 B.R. 795, 797-801 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981). See also In re Beasley,
102 F.3d 334, 335 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding the analysis in In re Loken "persuasive").
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60 of the Bankruptcy Act, stated that a transfer of personal property occurred
"when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property
obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could
become superior to the rights of the transferee."'36 However, this general
rule was subject to the following exception:
Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period of time of not more
than twenty-one days after the transfer within which recording, delivery, or
some other act is required, and compliance therewith is had within such
stated period of time; or where (B) the applicable law specifies no such
stated period of time or where such stated period of time is more than
twenty-one days, and compliance therewith is had within twenty-one days
after the transfer, the transfer shall be deemed to be made or suffered at the
time of the transfer. 137
This exception allowed the transfer to occur on the attachment date,
rather than the perfection date, if the creditor timely perfected its security
interest within the grace period under state law. However, in no event could
the grace period extend beyond twenty-one days after the security interest
attached. A creditor that perfected its interest more than twenty-one days after
attachment-even if perfection was timely under state law-would lose the
relation-back benefits in a preference action, and the transfer of the security
interest would be deemed to occur on the perfection date rather than the
attachment date.
3 1
The above provisions were enacted in 1950, when the drafting process of
Article 9 was still in its infancy.139 The first draft of Article 9 that received
widespread acceptance by the states was the 1962 Official Text. 4°
Perceiving a need to re-examine the validity of security interests in bankruptcy
136. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1968).
137. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(7), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1968).
138. See also In re Bumette, 14 B.R. at 798 ("Section 60(a)(7) referred to grace
periods under state law but limited their effectiveness to twenty-one days. A longer
grace period provided by state law would not help a transferee who failed to perfect
within twenty-one days.").
139. "The drafting of Article 9 commenced in the mid-1940's, principally at the
hands of Grant Gilmore and Allison Dunham, working under the general supervision
of Karl Llewellyn, and a number of tentative (or proposed) drafts emerged during the
late 1940s and early 1950s." DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 60 (2d ed. 1987).
140. Only Pennsylvania adopted the 1952 Official Text. The 1957 Official Text
doubled in popularity, being adopted by Kentucky and Massachusetts. The 1962
Official Text was the first widely accepted version, being adopted in every state except
Louisiana. BAeD & JACKSON, supra note 139, at 65.
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proceedings, the National Bankruptcy Conference"' established the
"Committee on Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code," chaired by Grant Gilmore, in 1966. In its 1970 report to
the National Bankruptcy Conference, the Committee proposed that Bankruptcy
Act § 60 be amended to state: "If a transfer is perfected not more than 21
days after the time when it became effective between the parties, perfection
dates from that time; otherwise, from the time of perfection." 142  The
Committee acknowledged that the only applicable grace period under Article
9 was a 10-day period in U.C.C. § 9-301(2) that protected certain purchase
money creditors against prior lien creditors.1 43 Nevertheless, "[w]hile there
may be no compelling reason in logic or policy for carrying forward the 21-
day period which, for whatever reason, was written into the 1950 version of
§ 60, that period has become familiar to the bar and is retained."' 44 In
summary, then, the "only change of substance" to Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(7)
proposed by the Committee was to adopt a fixed 21-day grace period,
"without any provision for cutting back the 21-day period if an applicable
filing statute uses a shorter period."'45 The Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States" adopted the Committee's recommendation in
its report submitted to Congress in 1973, other than proposing (without
explanation, but presumably to parallel Article Nine) that the grace period be
limited to ten days.4 7  Congress followed the Commission's
recommendation when it enacted 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) as part of its overhaul of
the bankruptcy laws in 1978.48
141. "The National Bankruptcy Conference is an organization of bankruptcy
practitioners, bankruptcy judges, and teachers of bankruptcy law. It was formed in
1932 in connection with the 1938 revision of the Bankruptcy Act and has been active
since that time on virtually all amendments to bankruptcy law." Countryman, supra
note 29, at 727 n.96.
142. REPORT OF THE COmmITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, reprinted in H. R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 204,
210 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6164, 6169.
143. Id at 6172.
144. Id at 6172-73.
145. Id at 6172.
146. The nine-member Commission was established by Congress in 1970 and
charged to "study, analyze, evaluate, and recommend changes" in the substance and
administration of then-existing bankruptcy laws. See Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468
(1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 545, 545.
147. See REPORT OF THE COMMIssION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATEs, Pt. II, § 4-607(g)(7), reprinted in 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 168
app. (15th ed. 1996).
148. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549,
§ 547(e) (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5873-75.
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The foregoing legislative history of the preference statute strongly
suggests that Congress intended a uniform grace period to apply rather than
any longer state grace period. Before being amended in 1978, the preference
statute deferred to state grace periods, but only if they were shorter than the
21-day grace period articulated in the preference statute. Professor Gilmore's
commission proposed a uniform 21-day grace period, making reliance on, and
reference to, state law unnecessary. Congress appeared to appreciate the need
for a uniform period'49 but, perhaps in an effort to harmonize the preference
statute with U.C.C. § 9-301(2), it reduced the period from 21 days to 10 days.
Only once in the statute's history did Congress expressly defer to state law,
and then only if the state grace period was less friendly to the secured party
than the federal period. If, in amending the preference statute in 1978,
Congress intended state grace periods to be relevant, it had a statutory model
in place from which it could have borrowed the concept (if not the language).
Instead, in what appears to be a manifestation of intent to make state law
inapplicable, Congress both deleted any reference to state law and shortened
the applicable grace period to more closely parallel the then-existing grace
period found in the only applicable provision of Article Nine.
State law proponents may respond with one or more of the following
counterarguments. First, Congress reduced the 21-day period to a 10-day
period in an attempt to harmonize the preference statute with protection
afforded by state law. Therefore, if a state subsequently adopted a period
greater than ten days, then this longer period would be incorporated implicitly
into the preference statute in order to preserve the harmony Congress intended
to exist between federal and state law when it amended the statute in 1978.
Second, the legislative history of the 1978 amendments itself suggests that
Congress intended state grace periods to be relevant, for, as noted by at least
one court, Congress enacted 11 U.S.C. § 547 in an attempt to "modernize[ ]
the preference provisions and bring[ ] them more into conformity with
commercial practice and the Uniform Commercial [Law]."'5' And third (or
as an alternative to the previous argument), using legislative history to
interpret the meaning of the preference statute is improper.'5'
149. The United States Constitution grants to Congress the power to establish
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States[.]" U. S.
CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
150. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 87 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5873, quoted in In re Busenlehner, 918 F.2d 928, 931 (1 1th Cir. 1990). See also In
re Hesser, 984 F.2d 345, 349 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Busenlehner).
151. United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia may be the most vocal
critic of using legislative history in statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Bank One
Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116 S. Ct. 637, 645 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment):
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In my view a law means what its text most appropriately conveys, whatever
the Congress that enacted it might have "intended." The law is what the
law says, and we should content ourselves with reading it rather than
psychoanalyzing those who enacted it.... Moreover, even if subjective
intent rather than textually expressed intent were the touchstone, it is a
fiction of Jack-and-the-Beanstalk proportions to assume that more than a
handful of those Senators and Members of the House who voted for the
final version of the Expedited Funds Availability Act, and the President
who signed it, were, when they took those actions, aware of the drafting
evolution that the Court describes; and if they were, that their actions in
voting for or signing the final bill show that they had the same "intent"
which that evolution suggests was in the minds of the drafters.
... There is no escaping the point: Legislative history that does not
represent the intent of the whole Congress is nonprobative; and legislative
history that does represent the intent of the whole Congress is fanciful.
Iat (emphasis in original). See alsa Conroy v. Aniskoff 507 U.S. 511; 519 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The greatest deficit of legislative history is
its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.");
United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 521 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (castigating the plurality for "resort[ing] to that last hope
of lost interpretive causes, that St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction,
legislative history."). But see Bank One Chicago, 116 S. Ct. at 644 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (responding to and disagreeing with Justice Scalia's view on the use of
legislative history, stating "I see no reason why conscientious judges should not feel
free to examine all public records that may shed light on the meaning of a statute.");
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. at 516 n.8 (Souter, J., writing for a three-
member plurality) ("Justice Scalia upbraids us for reliance on legislative history, his
'St. Jude of the hagiology of statutory construction.' ... The shrine, however, is well
peopled (though it has room for one more) and its congregation has included such
noted elders as Mr. Justice Frankfurter[.]"); Elizabeth A. Liess, Comment, Censoring
Legislative History: Justice Scalia on the Use of Legislative History in Statutory
Interpretation, 72 NEB. L. REV. 568, 580-81 (1993) (criticizing Justice Scalia for
failing to propose a "reasonable alternative" and suggesting that he "needs to
acknowledge that extrinsic material will be utilized and enunciate a test which allows
for its use."); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 847 (1992) (suggesting that "legislative history helps
appellate courts reach interpretations that tend to make the law itself more coherent,
workable, or fair"); Note, Why LearnedHand WouldNeverConsultLegislativeHistory
Today, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1005, 1006-07 (1992) (contending that "Justice Scalia's
hostility toward legislative history is too narrow in its result" and "too broad in its
justification") (emphasis in original); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use
of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-1989 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 306 (1990) ("If we are serious about
respecting the will of Congress, how can we ignore Congress' chosen methods for
expressing that will? . . . [L]egislative history is the authoritative product of the
19971
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These arguments, perhaps attractive at the initial glance, lose their luster
upon more careful examination. It is conceded that Congress borrowed the
federal ten-day period from the state law of U.C.C. § 9-301(2).112 However,
if Congress intended any subsequent extension to govern, it easily could have
built some flexibility into the statute by referring to state law generically
rather than to a fixed period of time under prevailing state law. Its conscious
decision to adopt a specific period, rather than to refer to an unstated period
found in a specific law (either then in effect or as amended from time to
time), reduces the likelihood that Congress intended to preserve federal-state
harmony at the expense of uniformity.'
Additionally, the quotation from the legislative history 54 is from an
introductory comment to 11 U.S.C. § 547 generally, rather than an explanation
of 11 U.SC. § 547(e) specifically.'55 And elsewhere, the legislative history
surrounding the replacement of Bankruptcy Act § 60 with 11 U.S.C. § 547
institutional work of the Congress.").
152. See supra text accompanying note 143; In re Loken, 175 B.R. 56, 62 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1994) ("Congress set the grace period at ten days to correspond with the grace
period provided under the Uniform Commercial Code."); In re Bumette, 14 B.R. 795,
801 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) ("Ten days was picked apparently because it
corresponded to state law[.]"); 4 JAMES J. WHrrE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCiaL CODE § 25-7, at 447 (3d ed. 1988 [Practitioner's Edition]) ("Presumably
the 10 day period in 547(e) was chosen to correspond with the 10 day period in UCC
9-301 and 9-312."); Young, supra note 38, at 230-31.
153. One response is that Congress may not have foreseen any need for flexibility
when it adopted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 because the 10-day period selected was
borrowed from the 1972 Official Text of U.C.C. § 9-301(2). Most states did not adopt
longer grace periods until after 1978. However, if Congress had looked beyond the
"official text" of Article Nine and examined what changes states were enacting, it
would have noted that at least two states had already adopted 20-day grace periods
before 11 U.S.C. § 547 became law. See IOWA CODE § 554.9301 (1995) (enacting
a legislative amendment in 1977 that extended the grace period to 20 days, effective
January 1, 1978); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-301 (West 1995) (extending the
grace period to 20 days in 1969). If Congress was aware that at least two states had
adopted longer grace periods before the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, then
its decision to adopt a fixed, 10-day period suggests that Congress believed state grace
periods were irrelevant. On the other hand, if Congress had no knowledge that states
were adopting longer grace periods when it enacted the Bankruptcy Code, even though
such knowledge was readily available, then its lack of foresight resulted from
misplaced reliance on a model version of a statute rather than an examination of the
versions enacted by the states.
154. See supra text accompanying note 150.
155. See In re Walker, 161 B.R. 484, 498 (Bankr. Idaho 1993) (indicating that
while the quotation "is certainly correct," it is "directed at the preference statute in
general, not the specific subsections of Section 547 here in issue.").
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evidences a Congressional desire to bring uniformity and coherence to a
preference statute that was hopelessly complex and the subject of varying
interpretations.' 56 This expressed desire for uniformity and coherence
potentially would be greatly undermined if resolution of critical elements of
a preference attack turned on deviations in protection afforded by the fifty
states. Furthermore, even after enactment of 11 U.S.C. § 547, some
nonconformity still remains between the preference statute and the
U.C.C.15 7--suggesting that Congress itself realized some dissonance would
continue to exist between the two bodies of law.
Also, the United States Supreme Court has held that "a court
appropriately may refer to a statute's legislative history to resolve statutory
156. See H. R. REP. No. 95-595, at 179 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6140. See also REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON COORDINATION OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, reprinted in H. R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 204, 213 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6164, 6170
("Present § 60, as even its dearest friends will concede, is, as a matter of language,
intolerably and unnecessarily complex.... It is believed that the proposed revision
of § 60 has succeeded both in clarifying the opaque language of present § 60 and in
clearing up unnecessary areas of confusion[.]"). Several courts have stated their belief
that Congress adopted the 10-day period in 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) for uniformity. See,
e.g., In re Loken, 175 B.R. at 62 ("Congress made the change to create a uniform rule
throughout the country[.]"); In re Walker, 161 B.R. at 500 (concluding that "Congress
intended that creditors be allowed a uniform ten day grace period within which to
perfect security interests"); In re Murray, 27 B.R. 445, 451 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983)
("The fixing of the 10-day grace periods in §§ 547(c)(3) and (e)(2) was an effort to
establish anational uniform perfection period for enabling loans in bankruptcy cases.");
In re Bumette, 14 B.R. at 801 ("It is evident that Congress did not intend for state
grace periods to be relevant under the preference statute. There was to be a uniform
rule throughout the nation.").
157. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(1) (1994) (including farm products within the
definition of inventory) with U.C.C. § 9-109(3) and (4) (excluding farm products from
the definition of inventory); compare 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(3) (1994) (defining a
"receivable" as "a right to payment, whether or not such right has been earned by
performance") with U.C.C. § 9-106 (defining "account" as "any right to paymentfor
goods sold or leased or for services renderedwhich is not evidenced by an instrument
or chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance") (emphasis
added); compare 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (1994) (providing grace period for all
secured creditors) with U.C.C. §§ 9-301(2) and 9-312(4) (providing grace period only
for secured creditors holding purchase money security interests); compare 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(2)(A) (1994) (commencing grace period at attachment) with U.C.C. §§ 9-
301(2) and 9-312(4) (starting grace period on debtor's possession of collateral). See
also supra note 44 (discussing technical differences between purchase money security
interests under U.C.C. § 9-107 and 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (1994)).
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ambiguity." ' 8 The ambiguity exists in the meaning of "perfection" as used
in 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)." 9 Those courts holding that the shorter period of 11
U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) controls have concluded that "perfection" refers to an act
taken by the creditor (such as filing a financing statement or complying with
the procedural requirements of motor vehicle law)," whereas courts that
have permitted creditors to successfully invoke the longer state grace periods
have done so after concluding that "perfection" refers not to an act, but to the
status that the creditor's interest enjoys against the competing interest of a lien
158. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991). See also Patterson v. Shumate,
504 U.S. 753, 761 (1992) (citing Toibb); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401
(1992) (same); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 255 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Whenever there is some uncertainty about
the meaning of a statute, it is prudent to examine its legislative history. [FNI: ....
As Judge Learned Hand advised, statutes 'should be construed, not as theorems of
Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them.'
Legislative history helps to illuminate those purposes.]").
159. See In re Walker, 161 B.R. at 493 ("Outside assistance in construing the
statutes is mandated in this case.., because the term 'perfected' is subject to at least
two different meanings as used in Section 547 in this context.... Both interpretations
are plausible, and the use of the term in the statutes creates an ambiguity."); In re
Holloway, 132 B.R. 771,774 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991) ("For purposes of this opinion,
this Court will concede ... that the statute is ambiguous."); In re Burnette, 13 B.R.
at 801 (concluding that the meaning of "perfection" is subject to two interpretations,
both of which "are consistent with the wording of the definition"). But see In re
Loken, 175 B.R. at 61 (acknowledging the arguments supporting the split in authority,
but, after "[l]ooking at the plain language of Section 547(e)(1), taken as a whole,"
concluding "that an ambiguity does not exist").
160. See In re Loken, 175 B.R. at 61-62; In re Holloway, 132 B.R. at 774 ("In
this Court's view, the natural reading of§ 547(e)(1)(B) is that perfection occurs when
the last act required by State law to acquire the desired status is performed."); In re
Holder, 94 B.R. 395, 398 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1988), affd, 892 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that, for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 547(e), the "security interest was
perfected by Wachovia filing for notation of a lien with the Division of Motor
Vehicles on August 12, 1987"); In re Murray, 27 B.R. at 448. See also In re Beasley,
102 F.3d at 335 (finding the analysis in In re Loken "persuasive"); Breitowitz, supra
note 39, at 397-98 (suggesting that perfection must refer to an act, rather than a status,
because a contrary interpretation renders 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(C)(ii) surplusage).
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creditor."' Therefore, gleaning Congressional intent from legislative history
is appropriate, if not necessary.
Another reason for adopting the shorter federal period over a longer state
period is that a trustee's avoiding powers are expressly subject to applicable
state law only if those powers arise under the Bankruptcy Code provisions
listed in 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)-and 11 U.S.C. § 547 is not one of the listed
provisions.162 Section 546, entitled "Limitations on avoiding powers," states
that "It]he rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544, 545, and 549 of
this title are subject to any generally applicable law that (A) permits perfection
of an interest in property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights
in such property before the date of perfection[.]"'63  This provision
effectively subjects a trustee's avoiding powers to a state's more liberal rules
on perfection and priority, but only if the trustee is exercising its powers under
one of the three referenced provisions." Noticeably absent is any reference
to the trustee's avoiding powers under 11 U.S.C. § 547, strongly suggesting
that state grace periods are irrelevant in preference analysis.
State law proponents may argue that Congress's failure to reference 11
U.S.C. § 547 was merely an oversight. At least three reasons suggest such an
argument is without merit. First, Congress has had several years to correct
any such oversight and has never attempted to do so. Second, Congress
161. See In re Hesser, 984 F.2d 345, 34849 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Busenlehner,
918 F.2d 928, 930-31 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Power, 133 B.R. 242, 244 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1991) ("Under Oklahoma law, the lien of GMAC was deemed perfected on Day
One even though the physical act of perfection occurred on Day 15."); In re Burnette,
14 B.R. at 801 ("The best way of looking at the bank's argument is to consider the
definition as referring to a period of time.... The court believes this interpretation
is the more reasonable of the two.").
162. Several courts have made this argument. See, e.g., In re Walker, 161 B.R.
at 496-97; In re Busenlehner, 98 B.R. at 602; In re Murray, 27 B.R. at 448; In re
Burnette, 14 B.R. at 800.
163. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1) (1994). "The purpose of the subsection is to protect,
in spite of the surprise intervention of a bankruptcy petition, those whom State law
protects by allowing them to perfect their liens or interests as of an effective date that
is earlier than the date of perfection." See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 86 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5872.
164. Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994), the trustee has, as of the commencement
of the bankruptcy case, certain rights and powers afforded to holders ofjudicial liens,
holders of unsatisfied executions, and bona fide purchasers of real property (excluding
fixtures). Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1994), the trustee is given the power afforded
by applicable law (e.g., the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, as adopted and amended
by many states) to unsecured creditors to unwind certain transactions of the bankrupt
debtor. Section 545 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the trustee to avoid various
statutory liens. And a trustee enjoys the ability to avoid certain post-petition
transactions under 11 U.S.C. § 549 (1994).
1997]
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referenced 11 U.S.C. § 547 numerous times elsewhere in 11 U.S.C.
§ 546,65 indicating that Congress intentionally, rather than accidentally,
omitted 11 U.S.C. § 547 from those provisions listed in 11 U.S.C.
§ 546(b)(1)." And third, scholars have noted the omission without any
suggestion that it was accidental. 67
Those still unconvinced that the federal period should control might be
persuaded by the fact that Congress extended the grace period available to
purchase money creditors in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3) from ten to twenty days
in 1994.' Both the 1962 Official Text and the 1972 Official Text of
U.C.C. § 9-301(2) permit a purchase money creditor to enjoy priority over the
interest of a lien creditor that arises after attachment and before perfection if
the purchase money creditor perfects its security interest by filing a financing
statement no later than the tenth day after the debtor first possesses the
collateral. 69 A majority of states have amended their version of U.C.C. § 9-
165. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 546(c)-(h) (1994).
166. See also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 86 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5872 ("The trustee's rights and powers under certain of the avoiding powers are
limited by section 546.") (emphasis added). But see Harrell, supra note 77, at 92 n.25
("The simple answer to this is that state law grace periods are not incorporated into
§ 547 via § 546(b) because § 547 has its own incorporation scheme, which adopts state
law grace periods for some purposes (§ 547(e)(1)(B)), but not for others
(§ 547(e)(2)(A)).").
167. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 21, § 3-18, at 117 ("The related-back
perfection that section 546(b) respects, while protecting against sections 544 and 545,
does not itself protect against section 547(b), by which the trustee can avoid certain
preferential transfers for antecedent debt .... This grace period of bankruptcy
preference law [codified at section 547(e)(2)(A)] ... is not extended by the grace
period of state perfection and priority law. Also, section 546(b) subjects sections 544,
545, and 549 to this state law, but not section 547.") (emphasis in original; footnotes
omitted).
One possible explanation for not subjecting the trustee's preference powers to
relation-back grace periods of state law is that the trustee's task in proving the
numerous elements of 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), and then surviving one or more of the eight
possible defenses of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c), is already sufficiently daunting without
introducing the vagaries of state law.
168. Reform Act § 203(1).
169. See 8 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES
§ 9-301, at 879 (1962 Official Text), 882 (1972 Official Text) (1982 & Supp. 1996).
All states except Louisiana adopted the 1962 Official Text. See BAMD & JACKSON,
supra note 139, at 65. All states subsequently adopted the 1972 Official Text. See
HAWKLAND, § 9-301, at 538 (Supp. 1996).
Determining when the debtor initially possesses the collateral (which triggers the
commencement of the grace period) is an issue that the courts have repeatedly
confronted. See WHI & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 33-5 at 333-34 n.30 (citing
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301(2) by extending the grace period to twenty days.17° As the legislative
history of the Reform Act indicates, Congress acknowledged this state action
by extending the grace period in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) to twenty days in order
to "conform[] bankruptcy law practices to most States' practice[.]"' 71 Yet,
as it did in drafting 11 U.S.C. § 547 in 1978, Congress selected a fixed period
of time rather than defer to any period applicable under state law. If Congress
intended for state law to control, it would have revised the preference statute
in a different manner.
17 1
The fallacy of this argument, state law advocates may contend, is that it
rests on somewhat faulty logic. Rephrased, the premise is that if Congress
truly intended for state law grace periods to be relevant in preference analysis,
it could have drafted the preference statute in a manner that expressly
manifested that intent; because Congress failed to do so in an articulate
manner, then one must conclude that state law grace periods are inapplicable.
But that conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premise. Maybe
Congress actually intended state law grace periods to have an impact. And to
belittle that intent solely because Congress failed to clearly express it in the
best possible manner is unjustified. Perhaps. But it seems that the
amendment process itself strengthens the thought that Congress never intended
that a purchase money creditor could successfully invoke the benefits afforded
by state grace periods longer than ten days in a preference action. Why?
Because if a purchase money creditor could legitimately rely on state law, then
Congress wasted ink and paper in revising the preference statute in 19 94 .1'
numerous cases). See also Citizens Nat'l Bank of Denton v. Cockrell, 850 S.W.2d
462, 464-66 (Tex. 1993) (citing numerous cases).
170. See supra note 117.
171. H. R. REP. NO. 103-835, at 45 (1994), reprintedin 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340,
3354.
172. For example, Congress might have amended 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) to read
as follows: "(B) that is perfected either (i) when the debtor receives possession of
such property or (ii) thereafter but within any period of time under generally applicable
law that permits the perfected interest to enjoy priority over the pre-existing interest
of a lien creditor."
One court, in dicta, has made a similar argument. See In re Loken, 175 B.R. 56,
63 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) ("Congress could have deferred completely to the states by
incorporating each state's own timing into the Code. Instead, it chose to continue
having the Code itself dictate the applicable grace period.").
173. One court made a similar observation during the pendency of the bankruptcy
reform legislation. See In re Walker, 161 B.R. 484, 499 n.18 (Bankr. Idaho 1993).
Two other courts have reached the same conclusion since the Reform Act became
effective. See In re Locklin, 101 F.3d at 442 n.8 ("It is difficult to see why Congress
would have passed this amendment if it did not believe that the federal grace period
in § 547(c)(3)(B) prevails over conflicting state-law grace periods."); In re Beasley,
1997]
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Those courts that have allowed state grace periods to dictate resolution
of preference issues have premised their reasoning on statutory construction,
policy, or both. The five-part statutory argument flows from the language of
11 U.S.C. § 547(e). First, a transfer in the form of a security interest occurs
upon perfection, unless perfection occurs within ten days of attachment, in
which case the transfer occurs at attachment. 74 Second, a security interest
is perfected "when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial
lien that is superior to the interest" of the secured party. 75 Third, state law,
rather than bankruptcy law, dictates priority between lien creditors and secured
parties. 76 Fourth, a security interest perfected within a prescribed period of
time (which, under either U.C.C. § 9-301(2) or applicable motor vehicle
statutes, may exceed ten days) permits a purchase money creditor to enjoy
priority over the competing claim of a lien creditor whose interest arose before
the purchase money creditor perfected its interest. Fifth, this state law,
necessary for determination of perfection under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B), is
implicitly incorporated into 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) through its reference to
perfection.
State law proponents have found a sympathetic ear to this statutory
argument in a handful of cases.'77 This argument is not without critics,
however. Some have responded by noting that while state law may determine
183 B.R. 857, 861 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995), affd, 102 F.3d 334 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The
recent amendment to section 547(c)(3)(B) . . . is further support for the Court's
conclusion that state law relation-back periods do not apply.").
174. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A), (B) (1994).
175. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (1994).
176. This point is undisputed. See, e.g., In re Hesser, 984 F.2d 345, 348 (10th
Cir. 1993) ("jl]n order to determine the date of perfection, it is necessary to determine
when the perfected security interest can beat a judicial lien in a priority battle....
This determination is made by reference to state law."); In re Busenlehner, 918 F.2d
928, 930 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Moister v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 500 U.S. 949 (1991); In re Hamilton, 892 F.2d 1230, 1232 (5th Cir.
1990) ("Since the federal law does not prescribe the circumstances under which or
when a creditor on a civil contract cannot acquire ajudicial lien superior to the interest
of the transferee, the source for such definitive standards must be the state law."); In
re Loken, 175 B.R. at 60-61 ("[F]ederal law does not provide the answer to how a
transferee protects its rights against a judicial lien creditor. We must turn instead to
the applicable state law to determine the method for perfecting a security interest as
against a judicial lienholder."); In re Walker, 161 B.R. at 488 (indicating that "state
law controls when Defendant's security interest was perfected as against a hypothetical
judicial lien creditor").
177. See In re Hesser, 984 F.2d at 348-49; In re Busenlehner, 918 F.2d at 930-31;
In re Power, 133 B.R. 242, 244 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991); In re Bumette, 14 B.R.
795, 801 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981).
[Vol. 62
HeinOnline  -- 62 Mo. L. Rev. 84 1997
PMSI IN THE PREFERENCE ZONE
the date of perfection, the date of transfer is controlled by 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(2). 78  But it is somewhat difficult to ignore state law under 11
U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) when the definition of its most integral term-
"perfection"-is dictated by state law. A more attractive statutory response is
framed by Professors White and Summers in their treatise on the U.C.C.
They contend that because 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) refers "to the time the
transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee" and the time the
transfer "is perfected," the statute is referring to two different times: the time
the security interest attaches, and the time the creditor takes the step necessary
to perfect its interest (e.g., by filing a financing statement). But if state
relation-back statutes are applicable, then the two events merge into one,
leaving "very little for section 547(e)(2)(B) to do."'79 They doubt Congress
intended such an outcome, and instead believe that Congress "probably meant
perfection as a status when they drafted (e)(1)(B), but meant perfection as an
act when they drafted (e)(2)(A)."'"8  According to them, 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(2)(A) should be read as follows: "At the time such transfer takes
178. See In re Holder, 94 B.R. 394, 398 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1988) ("[The 20-day]
grace period would not govern the date of transfer, but merely the date of perfection
under state law. This Court would still be forced to apply section 547(e)(2) to
determine the date of transfer."); In re Scoviac, 74 B.R. 635, 637 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1987) ("This grace period is not a relation back provision which controls the date of
transfer. Rather such date is controlled specifically and solely by § 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code."); In re Murray, 27 B.R. 445, 448 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983)
("Although Tennessee law is appropriate for determining the date of perfection, the
date of transfer is governed by the provisions of § 547.") (emphasis in original).
179. WHrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 32-4, at 258-59 n.13. Implicit in this
statement is the understanding that attachment pre-dates the act triggering perfection.
If the reverse is true (for example, if the secured party files its financing statement
before the security interest attaches), then attachment and perfection occur
simultaneously. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) ("A security interest is perfected when it has
attached and when all of the applicable steps required for perfection have been
taken."); id Official Comment 1 ("If the steps for perfection have been taken in
advance (as when the secured party files a financing statement before giving value or
before the debtor acquires rights in the collateral), then the interest is perfected
automatically when it attaches."). This concept of "pre-filing" is permitted by the
U.C.C. See U.C.C. § 9-402(1) ("A financing statement may be filed before a security
agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches.").
180. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 32-4, at 258-59 n.13. Professors White
and Summers would not be the first persons to ascribe a different meaning to the same
word in two proximately close sentences within the same section of the Bankruptcy
Code. See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992) ("Were we writing on
a clean slate, we might be inclined to agree with petitioner that the words 'allowed
secured claim' must take the same meaning in § 506(d) as in § 506(a).") (footnote
omitted).
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effect between the transferor and transferee, iffiling or possession occurs at,
or within, 20 days after such time .... "181
This interpretation appears more plausible than reading 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(2)(A) as, "At the time such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within any
variable period of time applicable under state law ... " It also recognizes
the dual meaning of perfection' and illustrates that both meanings can co-
exist in harmony within 11 U.S.C. § 547(e). Yet, its suggestion that the status
of perfection under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) can pre-date the actual act of
perfection under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) is statutorily incorrect, at least under
the U.C.C. Paraphrased, 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) states that a security
interest is perfected when the creditor's interest in the collateral is greater than
the competing interest of a lien creditor. Under applicable state law, a
purchase money creditor that timely acts to perfect its security interest within
the grace periods of U.C.C. § 9-301(2), or, alternatively, under applicable
motor vehicle laws, does enjoy greater rights in the collateral than does a
competing lien creditor. But while the timely act of perfection permits the
purchase money creditor to enjoy priority over the intervening lien creditor,
the status of perfection generally does not relate back to an earlier time (e.g.,
the moment of attachment). With the exception of motor vehicle statutes in
just over half of the states, the status of perfection commences with, but
cannot exist before, the act of perfection.'83 Nevertheless, because Congress
181. WHIrE & SuMMERS, supra note 10, § 32-4, at 258-59 n.13. Presumably
professors White and Summers use "20 days" based on the 1994 amendments and
would use "10 days" in all non-purchase money cases and all purchase money cases
governed by the pre-amended version of the statute.
182. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
183. See U.C.C. § 9-303 (stating that a security interest is not perfected until the
interest has attached and the "applicable steps required for perfection have been
taken"). See also id § 9-301(2) (awarding priority to a purchase money creditor who
timely files a financing statement, but nowhere suggesting that the act of filing makes
the security interest perfected before such filing).
Motor vehicle statutes in twenty-four states expressly back-date perfection
(usually to the date of attachment) if the creditor timely complies with prescribed
statutory requirements (such as delivering certain paperwork). See ALA. CODE § 32-8-
61(b) (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-14-805(b)(1) (Michie 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 14-185(a) (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 319.27(3)(b) (West 1990); GA.
CODE ANN. § 40-3-50(b) (Michie 1994 & Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 49-510(1)
(1994 & Supp. 1996); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-202(b) (West 1993); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 186A.195(5) (Banks-Baldwin 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A,
§ 702(3) (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN. TRANSP. § 13-202(b)(2) (1992); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 90D, § 21 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 168A.17(2) (West
1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 301.600(2) (West 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
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has borrowed a priority scheme to define "perfection" in 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(1)(B) and then used the same term in 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2), one can
plausibly interpret the statute in a manner that effectively creates a fictional
period of time where the status of perfection exists before the act of perfection
occurs. However, as one court noted, "[s]uch an unreal result should occur
only on clear and precise direction by statutory language or on convincing
demonstration of legislative intent. ''""I As analyzed earlier, 8 ' the
legislative history of the preference statute reveals that such a literal
interpretation of its language clashes with the underlying Congressional
intent.'86 Therefore, that interpretation should not be adopted, for to do so
would frustrate the judiciary's primary function in construing legislation:
effectuating legislative intent. 7
Some courts have adopted longer state periods in an effort to avoid
upsetting the legitimate commercial expectations of creditors who have
protected their security interests by timely complying with local rules. 8
But many legitimate commercial expectations of a secured creditor are
§ 261:24(11) (1993); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 2118(b)(1)(B) (McKinney 1996);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.2 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 1110(A)(2) (West
Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-3.1-19(b) (1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-19-630
(Law. Co-op. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-3-126(b)(2) (Supp. 1996); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 2042(b) (1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 46.12.095(2) (West 1987);
W. VA. CODE § 17A-4A-4(a) (1996); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 342.19(2) (West 1991).
Five additional states effectively accomplish a similar result through a concept of
constructive notice, rather than perfection. See ALASKA STAT. § 28.10.391(b) (1994);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-325(E) (1995 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-3-
202 (Michie Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-la-605 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§
46.2-638, 46.2-639 (Michie 1996).
184. In re Holloway, 132 B.R. 771, 774 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991). But see
Carlson, supra note 18, at 227 ("This last appeal to the 'reality' of 'perfection'
overlooks the fact that 'perfection' is not real at all. It is a figment of a creative legal
imagination.") (footnote omitted).
185. See supra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
186. Ironically, at least two courts have allowed state law to control even after
recognizing that Congressional intent dictated a contrary result. See In re Loken, 156
B.R. 660, 664 (Bankr. D. Or. 1993), rev'd, 175 B.R. 56 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994); In re
Bumette; 14 B.R. 795, 801 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981). One court criticized such
willful disregard of Congressional intent as "clear error." See In re Holloway, 132
B.R. at 775. See also In re Walker, 161 B.R. 484, 497 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993), a'"d,
77 F.3d 322 (9th Cir. 1996) (calling such an approach "quite perplexing").
187. See Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("Our objective in a
case [of statutory construction] is to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect
to the legislative will.").
188. See In re Hesser, 984 F.2d 345, 349 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Busenlehner, 918
F.2d 928, 931 (11th Cir. 1991).
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frustrated when a debtor suffers financial hardship and seeks refuge in the
federal bankruptcy law. For example, the creditor's security interest may not
extend to post-petition assets, even if the secured party included an
enforceable after-acquired property clause in the security agreement.'
Also, a creditor's ability to exercise any contractual or statutory rights and
remedies, such as seizing and disposing of the collateral"9 and collecting
payments on collateral directly from account obligors, 9" upon default are
severely constrained by the automatic stay.' Additionally, despite any
contrary language in any promissory note or other loan document signed by
the debtor, the creditor loses its contractual right to receive post-petition
interest on the secured obligation unless the creditor is oversecured.' 93
These three situations illustrate that the preference statute is not the only
provision of the Bankruptcy Code that can convert legitimate commercial
expectations into shattered dreams. Furthermore, they evidence a recognition
by Congress that even transactions untainted by illegality, subversive
collusion, or evil intent are not immune from attack by the bankruptcy trustee.
And to indict a statute in the face of such recognition is to engage in what one
court referred to as "unfortunate judicial activism."'94
189. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(a), (b)(1) (generally prohibiting a pre-petition security
interest from extending to post-petition assets unless those assets qualify as "proceeds,
products, offspring, or profits" of pre-petition collateral). See also U.C.C. § 9-204(1)
(allowing a debtor to contractually agree to encumber future assets).
190. See U.C.C. §§ 9-503, 9-504(1).
191. See U.C.C. § 9-502(1).
192. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
193. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
194. In re Walker, 161 B.R. 484, 498-99 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993), affd, 77 F.3d
322 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Adams v. Pugliese (In re Sevitski), 151 B.R. 590, 593
(Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1993) (criticizing courts that "permit avoidance only of those
transfers which were created by deliberate overreaching, and fail to realize that the
goal of preference law is equality of treatment, not purity of heart"); Robert Weisberg,
Commercial Morality, the Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable
Preference, 39 STAN. L. REV. 3, 11 (1986) (discussing judicial tendency to either
ignore or manipulate the preference statute in order to avoid unwinding normal
transactions); Carlson, supra note 18, at 217-18 n.23 ("First, bankruptcy is
fundamentally about the obliteration of expectations. Any theory that insists upon the
exaltation of one person's expectations must explain why the other fellow's
expectations should be looted and pillaged to finance such treatment. Second, the
argument is entirely circular. Creditors will expect only what the law tells them to
expect. It is therefore unsatisfactory to ground legal reform upon those tickling skittish
spirits-creditor expectations."); EPSTNI, supra note 21, § 6-3, at 280 ("Congress did
not give the courts an open-ended power to save all inoffensive preferences.").
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In confronting the issue, no court has examined the policies underlying
the preference statute and inquired whether the choice of federal or state law
would better further those policies. The policies are twofold.
... First is the policy that on the eve of bankruptcy (now 90 days) the
debtor should be required to treat equally-situated creditors equally. We do
not permit [the insolvent] debtor to pay one particularly favored creditor
while failing to pay others. 195 So we have the rule that authorizes the
trustee to reach back 90 days to recapture certain transfers made within that
period.
The second policy is to discourage secret liens. 3ut for the presence
of section 547, a secured creditor could take a security interest in the
debtor's collateral and decline to file a financing statement in reliance upon
the debtor's promise to let the creditor know if and when the debtor
planned to file a petition in bankruptcy (so that the favored creditor could
then perfect). The presence of section 547 makes that procedure more risky
than would otherwise be true. Since the trustee will be able to reach back
90 days, the creditor who takes a secret lien and files on notice of
impending bankruptcy, must keep the debtor out of bankruptcy for at least
90 days after the filing to protect its security from challenge under section
547.1
Whether a court uses federal or state law to define the contours of the
grace period available to purchase money creditors will not advance, and
arguably will hinder, the policy of equal treatment for equally-situated
creditors. Unlike other creditors, the purchase money creditor has either sold
the collateral on credit to the debtor or provided the credit that permitted the
debtor to buy the collateral. In the overwhelming majority of purchase money
195. This sentence actually reads: "We do not permit now solvent the debtor to
pay one particularly favored creditor while failing to pay others." WHrrE & SUMMERS,
supra note 10, § 32-4, at 253. Obviously a printing error exists in the quoted source.
196. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 32-4, at 253. See also EPSTEIN, supra
note 21, § 6-11, at 297 ("[S]ection 547 is designed to serve a subsidiary purpose
beyond its main goal of discouraging discriminatory dismemberment of the debtor's
estate on the eve of bankruptcy. The secondary purpose is to discourage secret
transfers that could mislead the debtor's creditors as to the true size of the debtor's
estate."); BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 139, at 479 ("Modem preference law.., has
two operative policies. The first is a policy against 'last-minute grabs.' ... A second
policy ... may be described as the 'anti-tardy-perfection' policy."); H. R. REP. No.
95-595, at 177-78 (1977), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138 (indicating that
the two purposes of the preference statute are to discourage creditors "from racing to
the courthouse to dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy" and to
"facilitate the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors of
the debtor").
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transactions, the creditor acts alone and, as a result, is not "equally situated"
with any of the debtor's other creditors.'97 Therefore, permitting the trustee
to avoid the purchase money security interest does not advance the policy of
equal treatment for equally-situated creditors.'98 In fact, unwinding the
transaction arguably has just the opposite effect because the pool of
unencumbered assets out of which non-reliance creditors"9 are paid just got
deeper, providing them with a windfall at the expense of the purchase money
party that either sold the assets to the debtor or extended the credit that
enabled the debtor to acquire the assets.
The two policies have independent significance, however, and "[t]he
actions of a given creditor may bring one into play but not the other, or one
into play far more strongly than the other."2" The latter situation arises
here, where the creditor has taken the step necessary to perfect its security
interest in a manner that is timely under state law but not under federal law.
Both state law (through either U.C.C. § 9-301(2) or relevant motor vehicle
statutes) and the Bankruptcy Code have the effect of discouraging secret liens.
The Bankruptcy Code does so by pegging the transfer date (which dictates
whether the trustee can prove that the transfer was made (i) for antecedent
debt,20 ' (ii) when the debtor was insolvent,2 and (iii) during the
preference period203) to the perfection date, or, if that date is within ten days
after the attachment date, then to the attachment date.2 4 Each day that
197. Two exceptions to this normal structure of a purchase money transaction
exist. First, the debtor may borrow money from a lender to make any down-payment
that the seller requires. Second, the debtor may borrow some or all of the purchase
price from multiple lenders. In each situation, more than one party may claim a
ratable purchase money security interest in the collateral. In the first situation, the
lender will claim a purchase money security interest under U.C.C. § 9-107(b) for the
down payment, and the seller will claim a purchase money security interest under
U.C.C. § 9-107(a) for the balance of the purchase price. In the second situation, each
lender will claim a purchase money security interest under U.C.C. § 9-107(b) for the
amount financed.
198. The policy would be furthered if the trustee attacked a payment transfer to
the purchase money creditor, for in that situation the creditor is equally situated with
every other unpaid creditor.
199. With respect to a particular asset, non-reliance creditors include (i)
involuntary creditors (e.g., tort claimants) and (ii) voluntary creditors (e.g., lenders)
whose decisions to extend value do not hinge on the debtor's rights in that particular
asset.
200. WHI E & SUMMMRs, supra note 10, § 32-4, at 253.
201. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1994).
202. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1994).
203. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1994).
204. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A), (B) (1994).
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passes between attachment and perfection increases the likelihood that the
trustee can prove these three elements of its preference action. In this manner,
the statute discourages secret liens by encouraging the creditor to perfect its
security interest as soon as possible. State law, triggered by the definition of
perfection codified at 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B), also discourages secret liens
by providing that a purchase money creditor enjoys priority over the
competing interest of a lien creditor if the purchase money creditor has
perfected its interest when the lien creditor's interest arises or within a specific
period of time thereafter. °" But if the post-attachment grace period for
perfection under state law is longer than the grace period in 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(2), then the shorter period under the preference statute should
govern. Why? Because it promotes the anti-secrecy policy better than the
state law does by endorsing a shorter period of time during which the
purchase money security interest remains a secret lien.
One must not forget that Congress also had a policy in mind when it
enactedthe enabling loan exception. In many purchase money transactions the
debtor acquires the collateral after credit has been extended. As a transfer
cannot occur until the debtor acquires rights in the collateral,2' the trustee
frequently can prove that the transfer secures repayment of antecedent debt.
But why should the purchase money lien be the subject of a preference attack?
The lien only encumbers those assets acquired by the debtor with the extended
credit; the debtor's remaining assets remain intact and available for
distribution to other interested parties, including unsecured creditors.
Therefore, no plausible reason for unwinding such a transaction exists. On the
contrary, the need to preserve such security.interests from preference attack
is self-evident: unless the encumbrance is protected in bankruptcy, the
debtor's credit pool will rapidly evaporate and only accelerate the debtor's
descent into bankruptcy. Rather than indirectly encourage such an adverse
result by allowing the trustee to unwind a technical preference, Congress
enacted the enabling loan exception, which benefits both the purchase money
creditor and the borrower without damaging the interests of any other
party.207
It would seem that the policy underlying the enabling loan exception
would best be furthered if the exception only required the creditor to prove the
purchase money status of its interest, i.e., the secured party extended credit to
enable the debtor to acquire the collateral, the debtor actually used the credit
to purchase the collateral, and the collateral only secures repayment of the
unpaid purchase price. Indeed, the creditor must offer such proof under 11
205. See U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b), (2). See also supra notes 123, 126, 129, and 131-
32 (citing motor vehicle statutes of 29 states that provide grace periods).
206. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1994).
207. See generally Orelup, supra note 37, at 237-38.
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U.S.C. § 547(c)(3).28 However, the creditor also must introduce evidence
that it timely perfected its security interest.2°9 But the policy for enacting
the enabling loan exception makes perfection irrelevant. Then why would
Congress undermine that policy by imposing a perfection requirement? The
only logical answer is that Congress's abhorrence of secret liens was a more
paramount concern than protecting at all costs the interests of purchase money
creditors. And as discussed earlier,210 the policy against secret liens is better
advanced if the parameters of grace periods are defined by federal, rather than
state, law.
In summary, a court that confronts the potential conflict between the
contours of federal and state grace periods should resolve the conflict by
adopting the former for four reasons: (i) legislative history reveals that
Congress intended a single, uniform period to apply; (ii) 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)
expressly subordinates the trustee's rights and powers under certain provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code to the perfection and priority schemes of state law,
but the preference statute is not one of the referenced provisions; (iii) the 1994
amendments to the preference statute were unnecessary if state law dictates the
parameters of the applicable grace period; and (iv) the choice of federal law
more effectively promotes the anti-secret lien policy of preference law.
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE AMENDMENT TO 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(2)(A): A PROPOSED INTERPRETATION
In amending the preference statute in 1994, Congress did more than just
extend the post-possession perfection period in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) from
ten to twenty days.2 It also tacked a cross-referencing phrase to the end
of 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A), making it read in relevant part as follows:
(2) For the purposes of this section... a transfer is made (A) at the time
such transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee, if such
transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such time, except as
provided in subsection (c)(3)(B); ... 212
The legislative history neither references 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) nor
explains why Congress added the italicized phrase.2"
208. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(A)(iii), (iv) (1994).
209. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) (1994).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 201-205.
211. Reform Act § 203(1).
212. Reform Act § 203(2) (emphasis added).
213. See supra note 4 (quoting legislative history of Reform Act amendments to
11 U.S.C. § 547). Observe that the quote does expressly refer to 11 U.S.C.
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Congress may have believed that the reference to the twenty-day period
of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B) was necessary to accomplish its goal of greatly
reducing, if not completely eliminating, the number of cases in which the
choice of either the federal or the applicable state grace period dictated
whether a purchase money security interest survived the trustee's preference
attack. In fact, no other reason is apparent. Yet, Congress accomplished that
goal solely by revising 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(B). The new language added
to 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) does nothing to further that goal. But it does
raise some interesting concerns.
Paraphrased, the amended clause states that a security interest transfer
occurs at attachment if perfection occurs within a specific period thereafter;
if the security interest is perfected after the stated period, then the security
interest transfer occurs on the date of perfection. Before the amendment, the
prescribed period was ten days in all cases. However, the amended statute no
longer provides a uniform period. The period remains ten days in many cases
and commences on the attachment date, but if the facts suggest that clause
(c)(3)(B) applies because the security interest enjoys purchase money status,
then the period expands to twenty days and begins running not on the
attachment date but on the date that the debtor first possesses the collateral.
Knowing when a transfer occurred is of paramount importance in
determining whether the transfer was made (i) for antecedent debt,21 (ii)
when the debtor was insolvent,215 and (iii) during the preference
period 216-- all elements of the trustee's case.217  Before the 1994
amendment to clause (e)(2)(A), the purchase money status of a security
interest had no impact on the trustee's burden of proof and became relevant
only if the creditor satisfied its burden of proving that the protection afforded
by clause (c)(3) preserved the security interest from attack.2" 8 But because
clause (e)(2)(A) (which historically has been within the province of the
trustee's case) now cross-references clause (c)(3), the purchase money status
of the challenged transfer may raise new post-amendment concerns. For
example, in proving when a transfer occurred as part of its case, may a trustee
presume that the security interest is not a purchase money security interest?
If the answer is no, then the enabling loan exception effectively disappears
from clause (c) (where traditionally it was invoked by a creditor in a defensive
posture only after the trustee had proved the existence of all of the elements
of its case under clause (b)) and becomes an additional element of the trustee's
§ 547(c)(3) and the purpose for revising it.
214. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1994).
215. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1994).
216. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1994).
217. 11 U.S.C. § 547(g) (1994).
218. Id
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burden of proof. As this interpretation would create a dramatic shift in
existing proof requirements, and no compelling reason can be suggested that
would justify such a radical change in course, such a reading probably is not
one Congress intended. Yet, if the trustee as part of its case can presume that
a security interest does not enjoy purchase money status, then one must
wonder what purpose was served by tinkering with clause (e)(2)(A), for such
a presumption impliedly existed before the amendment.
Maybe Congress had some motive for amending clause (e)(2)(A), but that
motive is not clear-at least from the amendment itself and the legislative
history. The United States Supreme Court has stated that "a statute must, if
possible, be construed in such fashion that every word has some operative
effect. 2 9  As suggested in the preceding paragraph, if given its literal
operative effect, the amendment would incorporate clause (c)(3) into the
trustee's case, leaving the enabling loan exception-as a creditor's
defense-redundant and superfluous. This reading would violate the canon
that statutes should not be read in a manner that renders words or phrases
redundant or superfluous." Therefore, unless one chooses to ignore the
amendment on the belief that Congress simply overreacted in its drafting, the
task becomes constructing the amendment in a manner that breathes life into
it without leaving the enabling loan exception lifeless.
One proposed approach is to limit how much of clause (c)(3)(B) is
actually incorporated into clause (e)(2)(A) by the cross-referencing
amendment. Clause (c)(3)(B) reads in its entirety: "that is perfected on or
before 20 days after the debtor receives possession of such property." The last
phrase, "of such property," refers to the property described in clause (c)(3)(A),
i.e., property that is subject to a security interest that secures new value (i)
given at or after the execution of a security agreement that describes the
collateral, (ii) given by or on behalf of the creditor under the security
agreement, (iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire the collateral, and (iv)
actually used by the debtor to purchase the collateral." 1 The last phrase of
clause (B), "of such property," effectively incorporates all of these
requirements of clause (A). And because clause (e)(2)(A) now references
clause (c)(3)(B), a literal reading of the revised statute dramatically alters the
219. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992).
220. See Gustafsonv. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (1995) ("[T]he Court will
avoid a reading which renders some words altogether redundant."); Connecticut Nat'l
Bank v. German, 503 U.S. 249 (1992) (stating that "courts should disfavor
interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous"); Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988) ("[W]e are hesitant to
adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders superfluous another
portion of that same law.") (footnote omitted).
221. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3)(A)(i)-(iv) (1994).
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trustee's case by adding to it the various requirements of the enabling loan
exception. This significant turnabout can be avoided if the last phrase of
clause (c)(3)(B) is omitted and, when reading clause (e)(2)(A), clause
(c)(3)(B) is construed as, "that is perfected on or before 20 days after the
debtor receives possession of the property subject to the transfer."
There are several advantages to reading clause (c)(3)(B) in this manner
when construing what Congress might have intended by cross-referencing the
clause in its amendment to clause (e)(2)(A). Before Congress amended the
preference statute in 1994 the purchase money status of a security interest had
no bearing on the ability of a trustee to satisfy its burden of proof. The
proposed interpretation preserves this irrelevance. Also, amended clause
(e)(2)(A) references "subsection (c)(3)(B)," not "clause (c)(3)." Arguably, the
proposed interpretation is a better expression of Congressional intent because
it divorces the numerous requirements of subsection (c)(3)(A) from subsection
(c)(3)(B) and incorporates only a grace period into (e)(2)(A), a statute that
itself provides only a grace period. Furthermore, the proposal honors the
canons of statutory construction by giving operative effect to the amendment
in clause (e)(2)(A) in a manner that preserves the enabling loan exception,
rather than rendering it redundant or superfluous.
As the transfer date moves closer to the petition date, the trustee enhances
its chances of proving that the transfer was made (i) for antecedent debt tm
(ii) when the debtor was insolvent,' and (iii) during the preference
period.&4 Therefore, the trustee (and the other beneficiaries of a successful
preference action, including unsecured creditors) hope that any challenged
transfer occurs under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) at perfection, rather than
attachment, since a security interest can never be perfected before it
attaches.' One criticism of the proposed interpretation of amended clauses
(e)(2)(A) and (c)(3)(B) is that the transfer date of some security interests
previously pegged to the perfection date will, under the proposal, revert back
to the attachment date. However, the number of situations that create a
transfer date at perfection under pre-amended clause (e)(2)(A) and a transfer
date at attachment under the proposed interpretation of amended clause
(e)(2)(A) should not pose significant problems for the trustee, as illustrated by
the following hypotheticals and summary chart.
222. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1994).
223. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1994).
224. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (1994).
225. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1) ("A security interest is perfected when it has attached
and when all of the applicable steps for required perfection have been taken.").
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HYPOTHETICAL #1: Lender advanced $1,000,000 to Debtor on July 1. To
secure repayment, Debtor executed a security agreement that same day that
granted to Lender a security interest in Debtor's equipment and inventory,
whether then owned or thereafter acquired. Lender filed a financing statement
on July 8. Debtor acquired (and, with respect to after-acquired collateral, will
acquire) rights in each unit of inventory and each piece of equipment upon
delivery.
HYPOTHEtiCAL #2: Same as Hypothetical #1, except Lender filed a financing
statement on July 16.
HYPOTHETICAL #3: Debtor bought equipment on credit from Seller, who
retained a security interest in the equipment under a retail installment sales
contract executed by Debtor. Debtor acquired rights in the equipment on the
contract date, July 1, and received delivery the same day. Seller filed its
financing statement on July 8.
HYPOTHEtiCAL #4: Same as Hypothetical #3, except Seller filed its financing
statement on July 16.
HYPOTHETICAL #5: Same as Hypothetical #3, except delivery occurred on
July 7 and Seller filed its financing statement on July 8.
HYPOTHETICAL #6: Same as Hypothetical #3, except delivery occurred on
July 7 and Seller filed its financing statement on July 20.
HYPOTHETICAL #7: Same as Hypothetical #3, except delivery occurred on
July 7 and Seller filed its financing statement on August 3.
HYPOTHETICAL #8: Same as Hypothetical #3, except Debtor did not acquire
rights in the equipment until July 3 (two days after the contract date), delivery
occurred on July 15, and Seller filed its financing statement on July 8.
HYPOTHETICAL #9: Same as Hypothetical #3, except Debtor did not acquire
rights in the equipment until July 3 (two days after the contract date), delivery
occurred on July 15, and Seller filed its financing statement on August 3.
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Hypo. Attachment Perfection TransferDate Under TransferDate Under
Date..' Date227  Pre-Amended Clause Proposed
(e)(2)(A) InterpretationOf
Amended Clause
(e)(2)(A)
#1 later of (i) July 1 later of (i) July 8 Attachment Date Attachment Date
and (ii) and (ii)
acquisition date acquisition date
#2 later of (i) July 1 later of (i) July Perfection Date (all Perfection Date (all
and (ii) 16 and (ii) collateral acquired by collateral acquired by
acquisition date acquisition date Debtor before July 6) Debtor before June
26)
Attachment Date (all Attachment Date (all
collateral acquired by collateral acquired by
Debtor after July 5) Debtor after June 25)
#3 July 1 July 8 Attachment Date Attachment Date
#4 July 1 July 16 Perfection Date Attachment Date
#5 July I July 8 Attachment Date Attachment Date
#6 July 1 July 20 Perfection Date Attachment Date
#7 July 1 August 3 Perfection Date Perfection Date
#8 July 3 July 8 Attachment Date Attachment Date
#9 July 3 August 3 Perfection Date Attachment Date
226. The attachment date is the date on which all three of the following exist: (i)
the debtor has rights in the collateral, (ii) the creditor has extended value, and (iii) the
debtor has executed a written security agreement that describes the collateral and
creates or provides for a security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-203(2) ("A security interest
attaches when it becomes enforceable .... "); U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (describing
enforceability requirements); U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(1) (defining "security agreement").
227. The perfection date is the date of filing, unless attachment occurs thereafter,
in which case the date of perfection is the date of attachment. See U.C.C. § 9-303(1)
("A security interest is perfected when it has attached and when all of the applicable
steps required for perfection have been taken."); U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(a) (stating the
general rule that a non-possessory security interest is perfected by filing a financing
statement).
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As the chart illustrates, in many instances (e.g., Hypotheticals #1, #3, #5,
#7, and #8) the proposed interpretation of amended clause (e)(2)(A) renders
the same transfer date as determined under the pre-amended clause. However,
in those situations where the secured party files its financing statement more
than ten days after attachment but within twenty days after the debtor first
possesses the collateral (e.g., Hypotheticals #4, #6, #9, and, to some extent,
#2), the transfer date under the proposal is not the later perfection date (as
determined under the pre-amended clause) but the earlier attachment date.
Because an earlier transfer date decreases the likelihood that the trustee can
successfully satisfy its burden of proof on three elements of its case, 8 the
proposal may not be welcomed with open arms by all bankruptcy constituents.
Yet, to use the creditor-friendly results in Hypotheticals #2, #4, #6, and #9 to
justify criticism of the proposal is somewhat unwarranted. In some
transactions (e.g., Hypotheticals #4, #6, and #9) the transfer date ultimately
may be irrelevant because the creditor probably can avoid a preference attack
by successfully invoking the enabling loan exception of 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(3).
And in those transactions involving inventory (e.g., Hypothetical #2), it is very
possible that the collateral that created the discrepancy in transfer dates will
not be the focus of the preference attack because the debtor will have sold and
replaced it with new collateral prior to the petition date. 9 Finally, non-
228. See supra notes 222-24 and accompanying text. If the debt arose when
Debtor executed the contract, then the trustee probably cannot prove that the transfer
secures repayment of antecedent debt in Hypotheticals #4 and #6 because the earlier
transfer date of July 1 is also the contract date. As illustrated by Hypothetical #9,
however, this proof problem disappears if Debtor does not acquire rights in the
collateral until after the contract date.
229. For example, in Hypothetical #2, the security interest in collateral owned by
Debtor on July lattached on July 1 and became perfected on July 16. The security
interest in collateral acquired by Debtor after July 1 and before July 6 attached on the
acquisition date and became perfected on July 16. The security interest in collateral
acquired by Debtor after July 5 and before Secured Party filed its financing statement
attached on the acquisition date and became perfected on July 16. The security interest
in collateral acquired by Debtor after Secured Party filed its financing statement would
attach and be perfected when Debtor acquired rights in the collateral. Under pre-
amended clause (e)(2)(A), transfers of collateral acquired by Debtor on or before July
5 would occur on the perfection date of July 16 because more than ten days pass
between attachment and perfection. The result might change under the proposed
interpretation of amended clause (e)(2)(A). Although more than ten days pass between
attachment and perfection, the transfers of collateral acquired by Debtor from June 26
through July 5 would occur on the later of July 1 and the acquisition date because the
security interest in that collateral became perfected on July 16, a date within twenty
days after Debtor first possessed the collateral. For collateral acquired by Debtor on
or after July 6, attachment and perfection of each security interest therein occurred
either simultaneously or within ten days of each event. Therefore, the transfer ofthose
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bankruptcy concerns, such as the possible priority of a subsequent creditor,
will continue to motivate most secured creditors to timely comply with
applicable perfection requirements as soon as practicable after attachment.
With the advent of electronic filing and the availability of numerous expedited
delivery services, ten days should be more than sufficient to accomplish this
task, making the number of cases in which a creditor may create a transfer
date discrepancy sufficiently small to preserve adoption of the proposed
interpretation of clause (e)(2)(A).
V. CONCLUSION
Before the 1994 amendments to the preference statute, many courts
struggled with the tension that existed between the ten-day grace period in 11
U.S.C. § 547 and the longer grace periods in many state statutes. Congress
has alleviated much of the tension by changing the grace period in 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(3)(B) from ten to twenty days, a period adopted by most states.
However, the potential for conflict still exists, as a few states still provide
more liberal periods or commence running their periods on a different date,
and additional conflict may erupt if states make non-uniform amendments to
their commercial laws. Analysis of the legislative history of the preference
statute, various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, the 1994 amendments
themselves, and the policies underlying preference law combine to suggest that
courts should resolve future disputes by adopting the federal period.
One future dispute likely to arise is the intended meaning of the phrase,
"except as provided in subsection (c)(3)(B)," that Congress tacked on to the
security interests would occur on the attachment date under both the pre-amended and
amended versions of clause (e)(2)(A).
In summary, the transfer date for security interests is the same (the attachment
date) under pre-amended and amended versions of clause (e)(2)(A), except for security
interests in collateral acquired by Debtor from June 26 through July 5. For security
interests in this collateral, the transfer date is the later perfection date (July 16) under
the pre-amended version and the earlier attachment date (date of acquisition) under the
amended version. Yet, if inventory turns over at least once before Debtor files its
bankruptcy petition, the inventory that created the discrepancy in transfer dates will not
be the subject of the trustee's preference attack. Rather, the trustee will challenge the
security interest in the collateral that Debtor owns on the date of the petition (which,
in the case of inventory that rapidly turns over, probably is acquired by Debtor after
July 5, the last date that creates a discrepancy in transfer dates). Concededly, the
foregoing analysis may not resolve the discrepancy in transfer dates for security
interests in (i) equipment purchased from June 26 through July 5, as equipment is not
as likely to turn over before the petition date, and (ii) inventory purchased during that
time if Debtor files its bankruptcy petition within a period thereafter that is shorter
than the normal inventory turnover period.
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end of 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A). This article has proposed one possible
interpretation that not only gives meaning to the phrase but also preserves
meaning in the cross-referenced subsection. As proposed, the transfer date
under 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) would mirror the attachment date if the
creditor perfected its security interest within 10 days thereafter or within 20
days after the debtor first possessed the collateral; otherwise, the transfer date
would be the perfection date. Congress may have intended a different
meaning altogether, but its failure to provide any guidance in the amendment
itself or in the accompanying legislative history leaves the intended
construction open to debate. One can only hope that in its next series of
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, Congress will bring the debate to a
close.
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